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CHAPTER FIVE
"the title to real estate"
5.010. INTRODUCTION
The category of exclusive supreme court jurisdiction "involving... title
to real estate"1 denotes two basic elements: (1) the subject matter of the
controversy must, in substantive law, constitute title to real estate, (2)
which must not only be at issue, but must be involved according to criteria
developed by the courts. These elements must be present in a case to vest
jurisdiction in the supreme court.
The object of the constitutional provision was to channel the significant
real property cases to the supreme court for final settlement in order "to
secure uniformity of decision on that important branch of jurisprudence."'
The tests evolved to determine the existence of the jurisdictional prere-
quisites function ideally to eliminate from supreme court jurisdiction those
cases in which questions of real property law are merely collateral to the
main issues presented. This chapter will outline the criteria used by the
courts to decide the question of appellate jurisdiction and will analyze the
consistency with which these tests have been applied. The cases will be
classified according to the substantive types of actions. The purpose of this
format is twofold: to point up the unique jurisdictional problems of
each and to make as accessible as possible the relevant jurisdictional author-
ity.
1. The constitutional provision for appellate jurisdiction is not to be confused with
the venue limitation for commencement of actions in circuit court which provides that
"suits for the possession of real estate, or whereby the title thereto may be affected ...
shall be brought in the county where such real estate, or some part thereof, is situated."
Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.030 (1959). Title to real estate may be "affected" in a case for
trial venue and yet not be "involved" for supreme court appellate jurisdiction. An ex-
ample is State ex rel. Shiek v. McElhinney, 190 Mo. App. 618, 176 S.W. 292 (1915), in
which it was sought to prohibit defendant trial court judge from taking venue of an ac-
tion to enjoin the violation of building restrictive covenants. The court of appeals had
jurisdiction, because the injunction action did not involve the title for supreme court
jurisdiction (§ 5.121) even though it did affect title for trial court venue within the
situs county-the enforcement of the easement so encumbered the title as to restrict its
free use and enjoyment. The case was expressly followed in Wearen v. Woodson,
268 S.W. 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924). To the same effect are State ex rel. City of Kirk-
wood v. Reynolds, 265 Mo. 88, 175 S.W. 575 (1915) (en banc) (enforcement of lien
of special tax bill); State ex tel. Haeussler v. Court of Appeals, 67 Mo. 199 (1877)
(seeking to enjoin sale under execution). For a discussion of "effect" on title to real
estate within the constitutional language of "involvement" see § 5.171(b).
2. Fischer v. Johnson, 139 Mo. 433, 439, 41 S.W. 203, 205 (1897) (dissenting
opinion), trans'd from court of appeals, retrans'd, 74 Mo. App. 64 (1898).
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5.011. Examination of the Record in Determining Jurisdiction
The general rule is that appellate jurisdiction is determined from the trial
court record-the petition, relief sought, subsequent pleading, and the judg-
ment rendereds-"at the time the appeal is granted, and ... nothing sub-
sequently occurring will defeat or confer jurisdiction."' Nevertheless, the
supreme court has been divested of jurisdiction in "real estate" cases when,
because of the death of a party, title to real estate is no longer disputed on
appeal" or no judgment on the merits can be entered.6 Though such cases
of "divestment" of jurisdiction are inconsistent with the general rule, they
occur only in rare instances and cause little practical difficulty.
3. Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d 771 (en bane),
trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928); Curators of Cent. College v.
Shields, 182 S.W.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1944), trans'd, 188 S.W.2d. 835 (Mo. 1945); see
Kennedy v. Duncan, 224 Mo. 661, 123 S.W. 856 (1909), trans'd, 157 Mo. App. 212,
137 S.W. 299 (1911).
4. E.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 355 Mo. 599, 601, 197 S.W.2d 299, 300 (1946), trans'd,
202 S.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1947); accord, Tant v. Gee, 348 Mo. 633, 154 S.W.2d 745
(1941), trans'd from 236 Mo. App. 133, 146 S.W.2d 61 (1940), retrans'd, 167 S.W.2d 67
(Ct. App. 1943). This is also the general rule stated for jurisdiction based upon "mone-
tary amount" (§ 9.021 (b)) and "constitutional question" (§ 1.024).
5. Hunter v. Hunter, supra note 4. On one count to determine title, the trial court
adjudged that plaintiff held a life estate and that defendant held the reversion, and on
the second count in ejectment granted plaintiff possession and damages. While de-
fendant's appeal was pending, plaintiff died. Though acknowledging the general rule that
subsequent events have no jurisdictional effect, the supreme court transferred the appeal
to the court of appeals because plaintiff's death made defendant the undisputed owner
of the fee-the quiet title count was no longer a "live" issue-leaving only the ejectment
count in which title was only incidentally involved. But cf. Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280
(3d Cir. 1959).
6. DeHatre v. Ruenpohl, 341 Mo. 749, 108 S.W.2d 357 (1937), trans'd, 123 S.W.2d
243 (Ct. App. 1939). Plaintiff appealed a dismissal of his bill to impose a constructive
trust on defendant's land but died pending the hearing of his appeal. The supreme
court transferred because the appellate judgment could not affect any real estate inter-
est claimed by the decedent since the heirs had not been made parties to the action. As
support for its holding, the court stated that there were "cases holding that issues can be
abandoned resulting in the loss of appellate jurisdiction, as where an issue involving the
title to real estate is abandoned" (Id. at 754, 108 S.W.2d 360), citing Nettleton Bank v.
Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d 771 (en bane), trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084,
11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928). But two of the cases cited in Nettleton and apparently re-
ferred to by DeHatre involved title issues which were not asserted as error on appeal.
See § 5.012, notes 15-16. They were not cases in which the court was divested of
jurisdiction by the occurrence of a subsequent event. Jones v. Hogan, 211 Mo. 45, 109
S.W. 641 (1908), trans'd, 135 Mo. App. 347, 116 S.W. 21 (1909) (defendant's prayer
for title relief "not insisted on appeal"); Whitecotton v. Wilson, 197 S.W. 168 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1917). The third case cited in Nettleton, Loewenstein v. Queen Ins. Co., 227
Mo. 100, 130, 127 S.W. 72, 84 (1909), cited the Jones case, supra, in overruling a motion
to transfer. It distinguished those cases in which title to real estate was an issue in the
pleadings, but in which the judgment appealed from did not involve title. The court in
1 5.011
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5.012. Judgment Sought or Rendered as the Basis for Jurisdiction
The basic standard for supreme court jurisdiction over real estate cases is
an affirmative appearance from the record! that "the judgment sought or
rendered" directly affects or operates upon title to real estate so as to deter-
mine it adversely to one litigant in favor of another.8 When the party seek-
ing affirmative relief is the appellant, the court determines what judgment
was sought by reference to the petition, not the prayer,9 of that party.1"
Therefore if the prayer seeks title relief not authorized by the facts
pleaded in the petition, jurisdiction is in the court of appeals.11 On the
other hand, when the defendant (or the plaintiff when counter-relief
is sought by defendant) appeals, the judgment rendered granting the re-
DeHatre also referred to cases in which the supreme court lost jurisdiction of "constitu-
tional question" cases because that question was abandoned on appeal. See § 1.024.
The DeHatre case and the Hunter case, supra note 4, are difficult to reconcile with those
in which the court has held that it has jurisdiction of an appeal when it clearly will be re-
quired to hold the trial court judgment invalid because not authorized by the plead-
ings-which is a decision on the merits of the case. § 5.012, notes 13-14. That is, it would
seem that the appellate court in DeHatre and Hunter had to determine whether the re-
lief granted was still authorized in view of the change in parties, arguably a decision on
the merits, and that this decision should be made only after jurisdiction is accepted.
7. E.g., Hanna v. Sheetz, 355 Mo. 1215, 200 S.W.2d 338, trans'd, 240 Mo. App. 385,
205 S.W.2d 955 (1947); Hilton v. City of St. Louis, 129 Mo. 389, 31 S.W. 771, trans'd,
63 Mo. App. 179 (1895). The requirement of affirmative appearance in the record is
based upon the limitations on the jurisdiction of the appellate courts imposed by the
constitution. The courts must determine their jurisdiction before deciding the appeal,
and the parties may not stipulate jurisdiction in one court or the other. E.g., Dubowsky
v. Binggeli, 258 Mo. 197, 167 S.W. 999, transd, 184 Mo. App. 361, 171 S.W. 12
(1914).
8. Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d 771 (en banc),
trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928), and cases cited therein. The
"direct effect" principle appears in varying forms throughout the title to real estate cases.
9. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 509.050 (1959). The prayer for relief is not part of a
pleading and may be disregarded in determining the relief authorized. Caldwell v.
Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930). The court, in determining its appellate
jurisdiction, will not consider whether the pleadings state a good cause of action, but
will only "ascertain the class in which the case falls with respect to relief sought." Nettle-
ton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 954, 2 S.W.2d 771, 775 (en banc),
trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928).
10. E.g., Munday v. Austin, 240 Mo. App. 41, 210 S.W.2d 714 (1948), trans'd, 358
Mo. 959, 218 S.W.2d 624 (1949) (en banc); Leach v. Armstrong, 149 S.W.2d 865
(Mo. 1941), trans'd.
11. Wood v. Gregory, 155 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1941), trans'd, 163 S.W.2d 355 (Mo.. Ct.
App. 1942); Brutcher v. Fitzsimmons, 343 Mo. 547, 122 S.W.2d 881 (1938), trans'd
from court of appeals, retrans'd, 130 S.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1939); General Theatrical
Enterprises, Inc. v. Lyris, 121 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1938), trans'd, 131 S.W.2d 874 (Ct.
App. 1939); State ex rel. South Mo. Pine Lumber Co. v. Dearing, 180 Mo. 53, 79 S.W.
454 (1904); Briscoe v. Longmire, 148 Mo. App. 594, 128 S.W. 521 (1910), trans'd from
supreme court.
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lief and sought to be overturned is referred to by the appellate court. 2 The
judgment granting affirmative relief controls even if beyond the pleadings
and petition and thereby void on its face.'" (Determination of the validity
of the trial court's judgment would be a decision on the merits which the
court could not properly render without appellate jurisdiction.'")
Because appellate review is limited to those "allegations of error" which
the party "aggrieved" by the trial court judgment has preserved on appeal,
isues and claims which are not disputed on appeal are no longer in the
case. 5 Therefore, the court must separate the claims decided at the trial
since only those actually appealed may serve as a basis for appellate juris-
diction; each claim for appellate relief is then examined to determine
whether it is one "involving ... title to real estate" (an approach which is
suggested by the organization of this chapter). If the supreme court has
12. E.g., Pursley v. Pursley, 213 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.), trans'd, 215 S.W.2d 302 (Ct.
App. 1948) (judgment rendered did not grant title relief sought by plaintiff); Kennedy
v. Duncan, 224 Mo. 661, 123 S.W. 856 (1909), trans'd, 157 Mo. App. 212, 137 S.W.
299 (1911) (defendant administrator appealed judgment granting defendant widow pe-
cuniary equivalent of dower). "[T]he appeal is not from the petition, but from the judg-
ment; therefore it is only where title to real estate is involved in the judgment that this
court has jurisdiction." Id. at 666, 123 S.W. at 857.
13. Albi v. Reed, 281 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1955); State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes, 345
Mo. 958, 137 S.W.2d 544 (1940) (en bane); Riley v. La Font, 174 S.W.2d 857 (Mo.
1943); Watts v. Watts, 304 Mo. 361, 263 S.W. 421 (1924); Domyan v. Dornin, 348
S.W.2d 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), trans'd, 356 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1962); see State ex rel.
Place v. Bland, 353 Mo. 639, 183 S.W.2d 878 (en banc), trans'd from 180 S.W.2d
538 (Ct. App. 1944); Herriman v. Creason, 352 Mo. 1176, 181 S.W.2d 502 (1944)
(en banc); Brewster v. Terry, 172 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. Gt. App. 1943), trans'd, 352 Mo.
967, 180 S.W.2d 600 (1944).
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
In considering . . . our appellate jurisdiction, we will disregard the fact that the
land described in the option is located in Texas. If we were to hold that we did
not have jurisdiction because the land . . . is not located in Missouri, such would
be an adjudication on the merits. Fisher v. Lavelock, 282 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Mo.
1955), transd, 290 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1956).
Accord, Tant v. Gee, 348 Mo. 633, 154 S.W.2d 745 (1941), discussed supra note 4; see
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Riss, 312 S.W.2d 846 (Mo.), trans'd, 319 S.W.2d
262 (Ct. App. 1958).
15. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 512.020, .160(1) (1959). City of St. Charles v. De Sherlia,
303 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.), trans'd, 308 S.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1957) (adverse judgment on
defendant's counterclaim for title relief not appealed), discussed in Garnett, Appellate
Practice in Missouri-1957, 23 Mo. L. REv. 401, 402-03 (1958); Reece v. Van Gilder,
272 S.W.2d 177 (Mo.), trans'd from 264 S.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1954), retrans'd (part of
judgment giving plantiff life estate conceded by defendant); Stephens v. Anth, 142
S.W.2d 1008 (Mo. 1940), trans'd, 147 S.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1941) (failure of trial
court to decree specific performance not complained of on appeal); Hayes v. Dunstan,
98 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1936), transd, 104 S.W.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 1937) (claim
allegedly involving title to real estate not appealed). See generally Bennick, Missouri
Appellate Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases, 1951 WAsH. U.L.Q. 486.
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jurisdiction of one of the claims, all issues appealed in the case will be heard
in that court."6
5.020. CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES
A claim for money damages for alleged injury to plaintiff's real estate
interest will not vest the supreme court with jurisdiction. Title to real estate
is not involved because a money judgment will not directly affect title-i.e.,
determine res judicata which disputant has title'--without the aid of sub-
sequent proceedings."8 Although title may be disputed at trial, this title
issue will be only "incidental and collateral" to the object to the suit'--ad-
judication of plaintiff's right to recover damages.2"
16. E.g., Howell v. Reynolds, 249 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1952); Missouri City Coal Co. v.
Walker, 183 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944), transd, 188 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1945);
Hyer v. Baker, 128 S.W.2d 1067 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 130 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1939);
see § 9.024, "Ancillary Jurisdiction."
17. Norman v. Summerfield-Jones Constr. Co., 319 Mo. 599, 4 S.W.2d 1064 (1928),
trans'id, 18 S.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1929) (damages for removal of sand and gravel from
plaintiff's land); Eighme v. Indiana, B. & W. Ry., 238 S.W. 479 (Mo. 1921), trans'd,
213 Mo. App. 342, 249 S.W. 717 (1923); Simmons v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry., 201
Mo. App. 477, 213 S.W. 149 (1919) (damages to barn by fire set by passing locomo-
tive); Schroer v. Brooks, 200 S.W. 1068 (Mo. 1918), trans'd, 204 Mo. App. 567, 224
S.W. 53 (1920) (trespass action); Coleman v. Lucksinger, 224 Mo. 1, 123 S.W. 441
(1909) (damages for breach of covenants in warranty deed); McKinney v. T. L. Wright
Lumber Co., 192 Mo. 32, 90 S.W. 726 (1905), trans'd, 131 Mo. App. 425, 109 S.W.
103 (1908) (damages for cutting and hauling away lumber); Ozark Land & Lumber
Co. v. Robertson, 158 Mo. 322, 59 S.W. 69 (1900), trans'd, 89 Mo. App. 480 (1901)
(cutting and carrying away timber); Cox v. Barker, 150 Mo. 424, 51 S.W. 1051 (1899),
trans'd from 71 Mo. App. 568 (1897), retrans'd, 81 Mo. App. 181 (1899) (trespass for
tearing down and carrying away fence); Rothrock v. Cordz-Fisher Lumber Co., 146 Mo.
57, 47 S.W. 907 (1898), trans'd, 80 Mo. App. 510 (1899) (trespass for cutting and
removing trees); Heman v. Wade, 141 Mo. 598, 43 S.W. 162 (1897), trans'd from 63
Mo. App. 363 (1895), retrans'd, 74 Mo. App. 339 (1898) (injunction against waste in-
volved "personal or pecuniary right").
18. Heman v. Wade, supra note 17 (injunction against waste "merely in aid of the
pending ejectment suit"); accord, Well v. Richardson, 320 Mo. 310, 7 S.W.2d 348
(1928), trans'd from court of appeals, retrans'd, 224 Mo. App. 990, 24 S.W.2d 175
(1930). In Weil, the sheriff was enjoined from executing a prior judgment for services
rendered a corporation upon the trial court's finding that the corporation charter was in-
valid, making the prior judgment void. The supreme court held that the judgment of the
trial court did not determine title as between the corporation and the plaintiffs (who
claimed the property had been conveyed to them by the corporation) but only the
validity of the former judgment. The court further noted that had the trial court denied
the injunction, title could only be "affected" by a "subsequent proceeding," i.e., an actual
sale under the execution. See Snodgrass v. Copple, 203 Mo. 408, 101 S.W. 1090 (1907),
trans'd, 131 Mo. App. 346, 111 S.W. 845 (1908) (right to homestead exemption from
execution); McGregor v. Pollard, 130 Mo. 332, 32 S.W. 640 (1895), transd, 66 Mo.
App. 324 (1896) (partition suit to declare charge on lands).
19. E.g., Heath v. Beck, 225 S.W. 993 (Mo. 1920), trans'd from 204 S.W. 43 (Ct.
App. 1918), retrans'd, 231 S.W. 657 (Ct. App. 1921) (damages for breach of agreement
in deed to furnish outlet); Price v. Blankenship, 144 Mo. 203, 45 S.W. 1123 (1898)
Washington University Open Scholarship
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5.030. Surrs CONTESTING LEASEHOLDS
Actions contesting leasehold interests are not appealable to the supreme
court because in Missouri a lease, no matter how long, is personal property,
(action for difference between selling price and amount due on mortgage); cases cited
note 17 supra. See Hunter v. Hunter, 355 Mo. 599, 197 S.W.2d 299 (1946), trans'd,
202 S.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1947); In re Ellis' Estate, 127 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1939),
trans'd from 110 S.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1937), retrans'd; Williams v. Mackey, 331 Mo.
68, 52 S.W.2d 831 (1932), trans'd from 40 S.W.2d 1098 (Ct. App. 1931), retrans'd, 227
Mo. App. 1016, 61 S.W.2d 968 (1933); Salia v. Pillman, 328 Mo. 1212, 43 S.W.2d 1038
(1931), trans'd, 49 S.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1932); Lewellen v. Lewellen, 319 Mo. 854,
5 S.W.2d 4 (1928), trans'd, 223 Mo. App. 262, 13 S.W.2d 565 (1929); Wuertenbaecher
v. Feik, 36 S.W.2d 913 (Mo.), transd, 43 S.W.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1931); State ex rel.
Miller v. Board of Educ., 18 S.W.2d 26 (Mo.), trans'd, 224 Mo. App. 120, 21 S.W.2d
645 (1929); Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d 771 (en
banc), trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928); Hydraulic Press Brick Co.
v. Lane, 205 S.W. 801 (Mo. 1918), trans'd from 198 Mo. App. 438, 200 S.W. 306
(1918), retrans'd, 211 S.W. 93 (1919).
In Hannibal & St. J. R.R. v. Mahoney, 42 Mo. 467, 472 (1868), quoted in
Rothrock v. Cordz-Fisher Lumber Co., 146 Mo. 57, 59, 47 S.W. 907 (1898), discussed
supra note 17, it was stated:
The primary object in trespass is to recover damages, not to try title to real estate;
and it matters not which side is successful, the title remains unaffected. The plain-
tiff cannot obtain judgment without showing title, where his ownership is denied;
but his proof of title is collateral, and a mere incident of the real issue, his right
to damages. (Emphasis added.)
The res judicata effect of a judgment which "directly affects" title is described in Cantrell
v. City of Caruthersville, 267 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1954); see § 5.070, notes 65-68.
20. In the usual damage action, plaintiff seeks only an adjudication of his right to re-
cover money damages. In these cases, the courts hold that since title is not sought to be
adjudicated, it is not affected by the judgment. In several classes of cases, however, the
decision that title to real estate is not involved is based upon another ground. In some
cases involving damages for wrongful appropriation of plaintiff's property by railroads,
the courts have held that title to real estate is not involved because "when plaintiffs
elected to sue for compensation, they surrendered whatever title and right of possession
they had to the land described in the petition; they acquiesce in the taking and appropria-
tion and seek to recover compensation and nothing more." Eighme v. Indiana, B. & W.
Ry., 238 S.W. 479, 480 (Mo. 1921), discussed supra note 17; accord, Griffin v. Missouri,
K. & E. Ry., 148 Mo. 516, 50 S.W. 1117 (memorandum decision), trans'd, 82 Mo.
App. 93 (1899), relying upon Edwards v. Missouri, K. & E. Ry., 148 Mo. 513, 50 S.W.
89 (1899), trans'd, 97 Mo. App. 103, 71 S.W. 366 (1902) (suit "not to get land back,
but the money value of it"). Thus these opinions seemingly turned on a lack of dispute
of title. However, a reading of the description of the pleadings in these cases indicates
that it is doubtful that the plaintiff conceded title in the defendant, and it is arguable
that the court reached these decisions on the merits when it concluded that the mere
seeking of damages conceded title in the defendant.
The judgment sought in a replevin action is recovery of a "personal chattel," e.g.,
crops severed from realty; title to the land may be inquired into but is not one of the
issues adjudicated. Fischer v. Johnson, 139 Mo. 433, 41 S.W. 203 (1897) (en bane),
trans'd from court of appeals, retrans'd, 74 Mo. App. 64 (1898). The judgment rendered
in a replevin action operates only "indirectly" and "collaterally" on title, Phipps v. Red-
man, 238 Mo. App. 571, 185 S.W.2d 848 (1945), and may be satisfied by the payment of
1 5.030
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not an interest in real estate.2 As a result, title to real estate will not be in-
volved."2
5.040. CLAIATS FOR DOWER AND CURTESY
"Effective January 1, 1956, dower... [and curtesy were] abolished....
But, 'any such estate... [then] vested' was not affected by the abolition of
dower [and curtesy]."23 Since claims may be brought only for dower estates
vested prior to January 1, 1956, the interest has only limited practical sig-
nificance. Nevertheless, an examination of dower cases illustrates fact pat-
terns that have caused difficulties in the analysis of the jurisdictional pre-
requisites of title to real estate, and involvement. Dower and curtesy are
virtually identical;24 because the interest of dower is more common, it is
more fully discussed.
money, Turner v. Morris, 222 Mo. 21, 121 S.W. 9 (1909), trans'd, 142 Mo. App. 60,
125 S.W. 238 (1910).
Title to real estate is not involved in suits to enjoin a future alleged trespass by de-
fendant. E.g., Sikes v. Turner, 242 S.W. 940 (Mo. 1922), trans'd, 212 Mo. App. 419,
247 S.W. 803 (1923); Hill v. Hopson, 221 Mo. 103, 120 S.W. 29 (1909), trans'd, 150
Mo. App. 611, 131 S.W. 357 (1910); Ozark Land & Lumber Co. v. Robertson, 158 Mo.
322, 59 S.W. 69 (1900), trans'd, 89 Mo. App. 480 (1901). See § 5.150.
21. Thacker v. Flottmann, 244 S.W.2d 1020 (Mo.), trans'd, 250 S.W.2d 810 (Ct. App.
1952); Blake v. Shower, 356 Mo. 618, 202 S.W.2d 895 (1947), trans'd, 207 S.W.2d 775
(Ct. App. 1948) (suit for specific performance of lease agreement); Bussen v. Del Com-
mune, 195 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1946), trans'd, 239 Mo. App. 859, 199 S.W.2d 13 (1947);
Thompson v. Thompson, 149 S.W.2d 867 (Mo.), trans'd, 156 S.W.2d 937 (Ct. App.
1941) (action to set aside a lease); General Theatrical Enterprises v. Lyris, 121 S.W.2d'
139 (Mo. 1938), trans'd, 131 S.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1939) (parties sought adjudication
of existence of lease); McCaskey v. Duflley, 335 Mo. 383, 73 S.W.2d 188, trans'd, 229
Mo. App. 289, 78 S.W.2d 141 (1934) (action to determine right to collect rentals);
Springfield S.W. Ry. v. Schweitzer, 246 Mo. 122, 151 S.W. 128 (1912), trans'd, 173 Mo.
App. 650, 158 S.W. 1058 (1913) (condemnation of leasehold interest); Smith v. McNew,
381 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (oral agreement to cultivate crops).
22. Cases cited supra note 21. In Thacker v. Flottmann, supra note 21, a judgment
was rendered for plaintiff declaring valid a mining lease and option for removal of mineral
deposits from land owned by defendant and declaring that defendant had no right or
title to the minerals. The supreme court transferred the case to the court of appeals on
the ground that the right conveyed by the instrument to mine clay was a chattel real-
not a real estate interest. Contra, Elliot v. Winn, 305 Mo. 105, 264 S.W. 391 (1924) (en
bane). In Elliot a lessee sought to enjoin lessor's forfeiture of a ninety-nine year lease, as
a cloud on lessee's title to the lease; the appeal was held properly transferred to the su-
preme court. This decision has not been overruled, but it was made without a jurisdic-
tional discussion; it is inconsistent with later cases because a lease is not real estate, and
also because the purely injunctive relief sought does not fulfill the "involvement" require-
ments. See § 5.150.
23. Sando v. Phillips, 319 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Mo. 1959) (action for assignment of
dower which allegedly vested prior to abolition).
24. Mo. Laws 1921, § 1, at 119.
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5.041. Dower as an Interest in Real Estate
Inchoate dower, a contingent future right, does not constitute an interest
in real estate for jurisdictional purposes. 5 Dower consummate, however, is
an interest in real estate, the title to which may be involved within the
meaning of article V, section three. 6
5.042. Dower as "Involving" Title
Title to real estate will not be involved unless there are disputed title
claims;" therefore, when parties to a claim based on dower concede that
interest, it cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction in the supreme court.2"
The dispute requirement raises a time problem. Since dower consummate
vests, if at all, upon the death of the husband,29 a controversy over dower
will focus upon a point in time prior to the institution of the suit. Thus,
the judgment in a suit to assign dower will declare and determine that title
to dower has previously vested in one party adversely to the contentions of
the other. The supreme court exercises jurisdiction over appeals from such
judgments.2"
In addition to the dispute requirement, title must be directly affected to
be involved."' The often-quoted standard for deciding "direct effect" is
25. During the lifetime of the husband the inchoate right of dower is not a vested
estate. Murawski v. Murawski, 203 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1947), trans'd, 240 Mo. App. 533,
209 S.W.2d 262 (1948), citing Brannock v. Magoon, 216 Mo. 722, 116 S.W. 500 (1909),
trans'd from court of appeals, retrans'd, 141 Mo. App. 316, 125 S.W. 535 (1910); Chou-
teau v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S.W. 458 (1893), aff'd, 122 Mo. 375, 30
S.W. 299 (1894) (en banc); see GILL, Missoui TITLES 45 (3d ed. 1931); 2 PATTON,
TITLES § 593 (1957).
26. See Sando v. Phillips, 319 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1959); Gebbeken v. Growney, 205
S.W. 721 (Mo. 1918) (curtesy consummate).
27. E.g., Goforth v. Ellis, 300 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1957); Stewart v. Stewart, 269
S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1954), trans'd, 277 S.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1955); Bussen v. Del Com-
mune, 195 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1946), trans'd, 239 Mo. App. 859, 199 S.W.2d 13 (1947);
Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d 771 (en banc), trans'd
trom court of appeals, retrans'd, 22 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928); Platt v.
Parker-Washington Co., 235 Mo. 467, 139 S.W. 124 (1911), trans'd, 161 Mo. App. 663,
144 S.W. 143 (1912); Krepp v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 99 Mo. App. 94, 72 S.W. 479
(1903).
28. Carlin v. Mulery, 149 Mo. 255, 50 S.W. 813, trans'd, 83 Mo. App. 30 (1899)
(contested value of conceded dower interest); see Lewellen v. Lewellen, 319 Mo. 854, 5
S.W.2d 4 (1928), trans'd, 223 Mo. App. 262, 13 S.W.2d 565 (1929) (distribution of pro-
ceeds of sale of homestead by consent).
29. See note 25 supra.
30. E.g., Sando v. Phillips, 319 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1959).
31. E.g., Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S.W.2d 1035 (1938), transd from 106
S.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1937); Toothaker v. Pleasant, 315 Mo. 1239, 288 S.W. 38 (1926);
Corbett v. Brown, 263 S.W. 233 (Mo.), trans'd, 266 S.W. 996 (Ct. App. 1924); Jenkins
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set forth in Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey: 2 "The judgment
sought or rendered must be such as will directly determine title in some mea-
sure or degree adversely to one litigant and in favor of another; or, as some
of the cases say, must take title from one litigant and give it to another.""8
The dower cases reveal a difficulty if the second half of this statement is an
independent jurisdictional prerequisite: the judgment assigning dower is
only declaratory of a prior vesting of title and cannot "take title from one
litigant and give it to another." The supreme court, nevertheless, has ac-
cepted jurisdiciion of dower cases without acknowledging the significance
of the second disjunctive in the Nettleton Bank statement, indicating that in-
consistency exists without causing jurisdictional difficulty.
A judgment which determines title binds the parties res judicata on the
title issue and thereafter serves as evidence of title (much like a deed)."
Because these are the effects of judgments in suits for assignment"5 or ad-
measurement 6 of dower, appeals from these judgments lie in the supreme
court. But when a widow does not affirmatively seek a judgment establish-
ing her title to dower, but seeks only the money value of the interest in lieu
of dower, the court's inquiry into title is only collateral or incidental to the
object of the suit; 7 such cases vest jurisdiction in the court of appeals.
v. Jenkins, 231 S.W. 581 (Mo.), trans'd, 234 S.W. 365 (Ct. App. 1921); Schroer v.
Brooks, 200 S.W. 1068 (Mo. 1918), trans'd, 204 Mo. App. 567, 224 S.W. 53 (1920).
See also note 17 supra and accompanying text.
32. 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d 771 (en bane), trans'd from court of appeals, retrans'd,
222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928).
33. Id. at 953, 2 S.W.2d at 774 (Emphasis added.); accord, Pearson Drainage Dist. v.
Erhardt, 196 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1946), transd, 239 Mo. App. 845, 201 S.W.2d 484
(1947); Devoto v. Devoto, 326 Mo. 511, 31 S.W.2d 805 (1930), trans'd, 39 S.W.2d
1083 (Ct. App. 1931); Stock v. Schloman, 322 Mo. 1209, 18 S.W.2d 428 (1929), trans'd,
226 Mo. App. 234, 42 S.W.2d 61 (1930).
34. See Gibbany v. Walker, 342 Mo. 156, 113 S.W.2d 792, trans'd, 233 Mo. App,
489, 121 S.W.2d 317 (1938); Ballenger v. Windes, 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S.W.2d 882,
trans'd, 99 S.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1936), ejectment cases in which title was held not
"determined" because the parties were not bound on the title issue by the judgment ren-
dered; see section 5.070. A judgment binding the parties becomes a link in the chain of
title. 2 PATTON, TITLES § 522 (1957). In Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 359 Mo.
282, 221 S.W.2d 471 (1949), title was affected because the judgment in an action to
quiet title would bind the parties on the title issue decided. In Cantrell v. City of Ca-
ruthersville, 267 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1954), trans'd from court of appeals (a case related
to Cantrell, supra), a conclusive judgment was termed a "muniment" of title.
35. Sando v. Phillips, 319 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1959); Pierce v. Georger, 30 Mo. App.
650 (1888), trans'd, 103 Mo. 540, 15 S.W. 848 (1891).
36. Lindell Glass Co. v. Hanneman, 46 Mo. App. 614 (1891), transd; Null v. Howell,
40 Mo. App. 329 (1890), trans'd, 111 Mo. 273, 20 S.W. 24 (1892).
37. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 231 S.W. 581 (Mo.), trans'd, 234 S.W. 365 (Ct. App. 1921)
(widow died before judgment); Kennedy v. Duncan, 224 Mo. 661, 123 S.W. 856
(1909), trans'd, 157 Mo. App. 212, 137 S.W. 299 (1911); Carlin v. Mullery, 149 Mo.
255, 50 S.W. 813, trans'd, 83 Mo. App. 30 (1899).
Washington University Open Scholarship
TITLE TO REAL ESTATE
5.050. SurrS TO PARTITION REAL ESTATE
In a statutory proceeding for partition "the court shall. .. declare the
rights, titles and interests of the parties to such proceedings... and deter-
mine such ights ...... ," The judgment will determine the real estate interests
of parties, but title to real estate is not involved unless the parties dispute
these interests.3 9
In Devoto v. Devoto,' ° the interests of the parties in the land were ad-
mitted, and after interlocutory judgment of partition, the plaintiff's motion
to set it aside for lack of a proper accounting was denied. The supreme court
lacked jurisdiction because the only dispute on appeal concerned pecuniary
claims.41 Dispute over title of the parties is necessary for involvement even
though title may be affected by the judgment without a dispute.4 2 Simi-
larly, if the parties dispute only the right to partition, or the susceptibility
of the land to partition in kind, jurisdiction is in the court of appeals.43
38. Mo. REv. STAT. § 528.160 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
39. E.g., Goforth v. Ellis, 300 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1957).
40. 326 Mo. 511, 31 S.W.2d 805 (1930), trans'd, 39 S.W.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1931).
41. See Stewart v. Stewart, 269 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1954), trans'd, 277 S.W.2d 322
(Ct. App. 1955) (title to real estate not involved when only the method of partition in
kind disputed). In Utz v. Dormann, 31 S.W.2d 991 (Mo. 1930), trans'd, 43 S.W.2d 883
(Ct. App. 1931), all the parties admitted their interests and agreed to partition. The
only issue was whether a deed of trust on the land, barred by the statute of limitations,
had been revived by later payments and was a lien on real estate. Title to real estate
was held not involved. See § 5.080.
42. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 325 Mo. 1161, 30 S.W.2d 63 (1930), trans'd, 34
S.W.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1931).
43. In cases in which only the right to partition or the susceptibility of the land to
partition in kind is disputed the courts have undergone an evolution to the present posi-
tion. In Cunningham v. Cunningham, supra note 42, the supreme court said:
In partition actions, the title to real estate has been held (by some of the courts of
appeals of this State) to be involved, so as to confer appellate jurisdiction upon this
court, ... where the question whether the real estate is incapable of partition in
kind is a controverted issue, or where the right of a party to partition of real estate
is denied by some pleading filed in the action. Id. at 1166, 30 S.W.2d at 66.
The supreme court failed to note, however, that the court of appeals cases which it
cited for this propositon do not authoritatively support the proposition that title is in-
volved. In Hiles v. Rule, 49 Mo. App. 628 (1892), trans'd, 121 Mo. 248, 25 S.W. 959
(1894), the court of appeals had transferred to the supreme court because real estate
interests of the parties were in dispute and would be adjudicated. Groes v. Brockman,
246 S.W. 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923), trans'd, 307 Mo. 644, 271 S.W. 752 (1925), did
support the proposition, but cited as authority cases which are inapplicable. Hull v. Mc-
Cracken, 1 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928), transd, 327 Mo. 957, 39 S.W.2d 351
(1931), retransd, 53 S.W.2d 405 (1932), had been ultimately retransferred to the court
of appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The supreme court in Cunningham failed to disap-
prove these court of appeals cases and implied that title would have been involved if
either the susceptibility to partition in kind or the right to partition had been disputed.
However, since neither was disputed, the case was transferred.
The present rule is that without more than these two issues, the supreme court lacks
jurisdiction. In Gebauer v. Gebauer, 163 S.W.2d 944 (Mo.), trans'd, 165 S.W.2d 333
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If a valid sale has previously been made to one not a party to the instant
partition action, title cannot be involved even though the previous real
estate interests of the parties to the action are in dispute. This is true be-
cause the judgment could not affect the title held by the disinterested pur-
chaser." The only recovery in such case would be in the nature of a money
judgment.45
When there are disputed title claims, the court is directed by the statute
to determine which parties had what title and interest at some point of
time prior to the institution of the suit for partition. The judgment there-
fore has the requisite effect on title and jurisdiction is in the supreme court.4
5.060. SUITS TO DECLARE CONSTRUCTIVE OR RESULTING TRUSTS
On appeal from an action seeking to declare a constructive or a resulting
trust, in which the judgment sought would declare the defendant to be
(Ct. App. 1942), the only issue on appeal was the susceptibility of the land to partition in
kind, which it was held did not constitute a title controversy. See Burch v. Horn, 152
S.W.2d 88 (Mo.), trans'd, 236 Mo. App. 388, 156 S.W.2d 929 (1941); Leach v. Arm-
strong, 149 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.), trans'd, 236 Mo. App. 382, 156 S.W.2d 959 (1941).
In Brockman v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 38 S.W.2d 1010 (Mo. 1931), trans'd, 44
S.W.2d 877 (Ct. App. 1932), the defendants conceded the allegations of interests, but
contended that the plaintiffs had no right to maintain the partition suit. The case was
transferred to the court of appeals. Accord, Farmer v. Littlefield, 355 Mo. 243, 195
S.W.2d 657 (1946), trans'd; Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 40 S.W.2d 555 (Mo.), trans'd,
226 Mo. App. 172, 43 S.W.2d 879 (1931); see Mack v. Mack, 281 S.W.2d 872 (Mo.
1955), trans'd, 286 S.W.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1956).
44. Mitchell v. McClelland, 306 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957). The court held
title not involved, since title was in a stranger, and the validity of the sale was not at-
tacked. It noted that the dispute concerned only the proceeds of the sale, although the
trial court had to ascertain the interests of the parties prior to the sale. Accord, Funk v.
Funk, 205 App. 178, 223 S.W. 780 (1920).
45. Lewellen v. Lewellen, 319 Mo. 854, 5 S.W.2d 4 (1928), trans'd, 223 Mo. App.
262, 13 S.W.2d 565 (1929) (only question on appeal was distribution of proceeds).
46. See Richards v. Stewart, 185 Mo. 533, 84 S.W. 1181 (1904). This was a memo-
randum decision holding that partition of land among the devisees of a will confers no
title, but only designates the boundaries, and the title of one to her allotted shares re-
lated back to the time of the vesting under the devise. (Court accepted jurisdiction.)
If the action seeks only to set aside the partition sale jurisdiction is generally not in
the supreme court. In Tucker v. Burford, 337 Mo. 1073, 88 S.W.2d 144 (1935), trans'd,
95 S.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1936), the defendant appealed the overruling of his motion to
set aside the sale. The moving party had earlier defaulted to the plaintiff's petition. The
court held that since the moving party did not dispute title, the judgment could not de-
termine title adversely to one party and in favor of another, so title was not involved. The
motion was apparently made before the sheriff had executed the deed to the purchasers,
since after the deed was executed to a disinterested purchaser, his title could not be af-
fected. See Hiles v. Rule, 49 Mo. App. 628, 631 (1892), trans'd, 121 Mo. 248, 25 S.W.
959 (1894), stating that the title of a disinterested purchaser could not be adjudged in a
proceeding to which he was not a party.
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the holder of the title in trust for the plaintiff, jurisdiction belongs in the
supreme court.' The effect of the judgment is that at least equitable title'
is declared to be in the plaintiff as of the moment when the trust arose. 9
47. Davis v. Roberts, 365 Mo. 1195, 295 S.W.2d 152 (1956) (purchase money result-
ing trust); Park v. Park, 259 S.W. 417 (Mo. 1924) (trust arising ex maleficio, although
mistermed a resulting trust). No jurisdictional decisions were found relating to express
trusts.
That the Missouri courts often fail to distinguish between resulting trusts and construc-
tive trusts, arising ex maleficio, is admitted in Jankowski v. Delfert, 356 Mo. 184, 187, 201
S.W.2d 331, 332 (1947). See James v. James, 248 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1952) ("resulting
trust" based upon fraud); Kuhn v. Zepp, 355 Mo. 295, 196 S.W.2d 249 (1946). For
a definition of constructive trusts, see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160 (1937); for
a definition of resulting trusts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 404 (1959). Con-
structive trusts are distinguished from resulting trusts in 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 462.1 (2d ed.
1956). This failure, however, has not led to incorrect jurisdictional decisions because the
"dispute" and "effect" on title are identical in both cases. The Missouri statute on re-
suIting trusts applies also to constructive trusts. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.030 (1959),
Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18, 26 (Mo. 1955).
48. Missouri law apparently fails to specify whether the trust is executed by the
Statute of Uses, thus placing full legal title in the plaintiff when a resulting trust arises.
The Missouri statute on resulting trusts applies also to constructive trusts, supra note 47.
Resulting trusts are passive, Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S.W. 634
(1914), and thus would, without more, be executed by the Statute of Uses, Mo. REv.
STAT. § 456.020 (1959). However, the order of appearance of the statutes referring
to trusts causes confusion whether this occurs. The order is: Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.010
(Statute of Frauds); § 456.020 (Statute of Uses) ; § 456.030 (provides that "the act"
shall not apply to resulting trusts). It is unclear whether by "the act" it is meant that
only the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts, or that the Statute of Uses
also does not apply. Some writers assume that the Missouri Statute of Uses does not
execute resulting trusts. GILL, MIssouRI TITLES § 856, at 428 (3d ed. 1931); 1 SCOTT,
TRUSTS § 73, at 610 (2d ed. 1956). In Scholle v. Laumann, 139 S.W.2d 1067 (Mo.
App. 1940), it was held that the word "act" referred to the Statute of Frauds, but noth-
ing was said to indicate whether it applies also to the Statute of Uses.
Missouri law also apparently fails to specify whether the judgment necessarily ac-
complishes the further step of passing legal title. Probably, if the Statute of Uses does
not have this effect, a trial court, cognizant of this fact, would take this step to avoid
perpetuating a purposeless division of equitable and legal title, although the division
is arguably justifiable in some situations. See I SCOTT, TRUSTS § 73, at 611 (2d ed.
1956). The form of relief sought may also dictate the passage of legal title by the
judgment. See Baler v. Berberich, 77 Mo. 413 (1883), holding that a constructive trust
imposes upon the trustee the duty to reconvey title to the plaintiff. A decree establish-
ing the trust and enforcing the duty to reconvey title acts itself as a reconveyance of
title. Mo. REv. STAT. § 511.300 (1959).
49. The trust arises when operative facts creating a right to trust relief come into
existence, not when the court grants relief. Professor Scott states that "the beneficial
interest in the property is from the beginning in the person who has been wronged ....
It arises when the duty to make restitution arises, not when that duty is subsequently
enforced." 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 462.4, at 3110 (2d ed. 1956). See McConnell v. Deal,
296 Mo. 275, 246 S.W. 594 (1922) (en banc) (express trust): "A court of equity may
declare, construe, and administer trusts, but it cannot create one." Id. at 297, 246 S.W.
at 598.
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The judgment stands as a muniment of the equitable title, which constitutes
"title to real estate." 50
The fact that the petition on its face seeks or concerns a "trust" is not
necessarily sufficient to confer supreme court jurisdiction. In Brannock v.
Magoon51 the petition sought to impress a resulting trust on land held by
defendant, asked that the "trust" be charged "as a first lien on said prop-
erty, and that said property be sold to satisfy and discharge said trust.1'52
When defendant's appeal reached the supreme court, the court acknowl-
edged that "in the ordinary action to declare a resulting trust," in which
"the petition asks that by reason of a resulting trust the title to real estate
be decreed out of one person and decreed to be in another," title to real
estate is involved. 3 In holding that it did not have jurisdiction, the court
noted that the judgment appealed only decreed a lien-the precise relief
sought by plaintiff-even though ostensibly the suit was for a declaration of
a "trust."
5 4
5.070. ACTIONS IN EJECTMENT
The jurisdictional decisions in ejectment cases illustrate the development
of the requirement that title be directly involved, and not merely incident-
ally examined. The traditional action of simple ejectment sought only a
judgment for possession; the right to possession was determined upon the
strength of the title claimed by each party. If neither party sought affirma-
tive adjudication of title, the action remained one at law and the judgment
rendered could not be res judicata on the title issue." Nevertheless, prior
to 1936 it was "beyond dispute that an action at law in ejectment was a
case... involving title to real estate,"55 unless title was conceded, " because
50. Morris v. Glare, 132 Mo. 232, 33 S.W. 1123 (1896).
51. 216 Mo. 722, 116 S.W. 500 (1909), trans'd from court of appeals, retrans'd, 141
Mo. App. 316, 125 S.W. 535 (1910).
52. Id. at 726, 116 S.W. at 502.
53. Ibid. (Emphasis added.) But see Hewitt v. Price, 74 S.W. 884 (Mo. Ct. App.
1903), trans.d, in which the plaintiff appealed a decree declaring that plaintiff had
bought the land at reduced value and that he pay the defendant the loss suffered. The
court of appeals transferred to the supreme court, because "while the decree does not
divest plaintiff of the title to the land in question, it confirms his title thereto, and
charges it within his hands with a resulting trust for the benefit of defendants." Id. at
885-86. This decision is questionable, because the judgment would seem to be in the
nature of a lien, and could have been satisfied by the payment of money.
54. Cf. Mack v. Mack, 281 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. 1955), trans'd 286 S.W.2d 385 (Ct.
App. 1956).
55. E.g., Sutton v. Dameron, 100 Mo. 141, 13 S.W. 497, 499-500 (1890); Kimmel
v. Benna, 70 Mo. 52 (1879), discussed in Sanowicr & WArr, TRLUL or TITLE TO LAND
§ 511, at 325-26 (1882).
56. Dunn v. Miller, 96 Mo. 324, 334, 9 S.W. 640, 643 (1888), transd from 18 Mo.
App. 136 (1885).
57. Even prior to 1936, title was not involved in ejectment when title was not dis-
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it was "necessary for the court to determine which party had legal title to
the real estate in order to determine which was entitled to possession."ss
The reasoning of the early ejectment cases was inconsistent with that which
had previously lodged trespass appeals in the courts of appeals because the
title examination was only "incidental and collateral." 9 The supreme court
puted, as for example, when the dispute concerned only a lease or a license. Wood v.
Gregory, 155 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1941), trans'd, 163 S.W.2d 355 (Ct. App. 1942)
(license); Sasse v. Sparkman, 53 S.W.2d 261 (Mo.), trans'd from 45 S.W.2d 1112 (Ct.
App. 1932), retrans'd, 65 S.W.2d 1067 (Ct. App. 1933) (lease); G. M. Mining Co. v.
Hodge, 185 Mo. App. 138, 170 S.W. 689 (1914) (license to mine for term of years).
58. Williams v. Maxwell, 82 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Mo. 1935). The view that the
concepts of "title" and "possession" were not separable had considerable support in the
earlier cases. For citation of this authority, see Ballenger v. Windes, 338 Mo. 1039, 1044,
93 S.W.2d 882, 884 (dissenting opinion), trans'd, 99 S.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1936), in
which it is stated that "'ejectment is a possessory action. Title to real estate is involved
in ejectment only as an incident to the possession upon which the action is based. The
title is presumed to be with the possession.'" Id. at 1047, 93 S.W.2d at 886. See Tice v.
Hamilton, 188 Mo. 298, 87 S.W. 497 (1905), trans'd from 94 Mo. App. 198, 67 S.W.
957 (1903). The court's restrictive definition of the "effect" requirement has led to
other objections by dissenting judges that cases "necessarily" involving "title" were being
transferred. E.g., Well v. Richardson, 320 Mo. 310, 316, 7 S.W.2d 348, 351 (1928)
(dissenting opinion), discussed supra note 18; Snodgrass v. Coople, 203 Mo. 480, 490,
101 S.W. 1090, 1093 (1907) (dissenting opinion), discussed supra note 17.
59. Section 5.020.
The acceptance by the supreme court of ejectment actions regardless of their inconclu-
sive effect on title is undoubtedly due to the extreme importance historically accorded
ejectment by the Missouri courts, rather than to technical considerations of "involvement"
of title to real estate. Until 1855, a party claiming title could in no way obtain a judg-
ment certain to conclude title. By Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 128, § 62 (1855), a party in pos-
session of land could force anyone claiming title adverse to his own to show cause
why that person should not bring an action to try the alleged title under a penalty of
being forever barred from claiming any interest. However, if the suitor's opponent did
show cause or did bring an action to try title, the statute then did not act to make the
judgment in the opponent's forced action conclusive, so it is reasonable to assume the
action forced would be an inconclusive ejectment action. See Meriwether v. Love, 167
Mo. 514, 519, 67 S.W. 250, 251 (1902). Not until 1897 did the general assembly decide
that a party might institute an action certain to conclude the parties on the title issue,
when it provided that any person claiming title may cause it to be determined against any
adverse claimants. Mo. LAws 1897, at 74 (now Mo. Rv. STAT. § 527.150 (1950), re-
pealing Mo. Rav. STAT. ch. 128, J 162 (1855)). Hudson v. Wright, 204 Mo. 412, 103
S.W. 8 (1907); Meriwether v. Love, supra. Thus, until 1897, ejectment was the only
action the purpose of which was to try title. (While title might have been decided in
a trespass action, the central purpose of trespass was to recover damages.) This was true
even though the ostensible purpose of ejectment was the recovery of possession. The
theory of ejectment was unique because the central position of the title was clouded by
fictional issues and also because "the issues and proof may be broader than as indicated
by the pleadings, unique, also, in that . . . the plaintiff must go beyond the issues so
tendered, in the petition." Ballenger v. Windes, supra note 58, at 1045, 93 S.W.2d at 885
(dissenting opinion). After 1897, ejectment no longer had this importance as the only
action for the trial of title. But the decisions lodging appeals in the supreme court indi-
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erased the inconsistency in 1936 by overruling the early cases. In Ballenger
v. Windes,60 the court held that examining and deciding title only for the
purpose of adjudicating the right to possession, did not involve title. Two
years later in Gibbany v. Walker,"' the supreme court upheld Ballenger,
stating that a judgment in ejectment was no bar to a second action on the
title issue, "which could not be true if ejectment determined title in the
modem sense."" Of course, if an equitable plea or defense seeking con-
clusive determination of title is raised, the action becomes a suit in equity
and the claim for affirmative title relief may be a basis for supreme court
jurisdiction.'
cate a lingering influence of the historical import of ejectment actions. It would seem
that even as early as 1895, the general assembly recognized that the judgment in eject-
ment did not fulfill the "direct effect" criterion, but that the importance of the action,
notwithstanding this defect, justified lodging ejectment appeals in the supreme court. In
1895 the general assembly proposed a constitutional amendment, later rejected, which
contained the provision: "Cases involving title to real estate are cases only wherein the
decree or judgment rendered affects directly the title of the appellant to certain real
estate, and actions of ejectment." Mo. Laws 1895, at 287. (Emphasis added.) See "In-
troduction," notes 35, 37 and accompanying text.
60. 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S.W.2d 882, trans'd, 99 S.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1936). De-
fendant appealed judgment for plaintiffs granting posession and damages. Although the
facts pleaded might have authorized title relief had it been sought, the court held that
the decisive jurisdictional criterion was the relief the parties did seek and which in fact
was granted. See also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
61. 342 Mo. 156, 113 S.W.2d 792, trans'd, 233 Mo. App. 489, 121 S.W.2d 317
(1938).
62. Id. at 160, 113 S.W.2d at 794. (Emphasis added.) The court noted that even
though in Missouri title to real estate had been held to be involved in ejectment actions,
the judgment in such actions had never been conclusive on title, that ejectment was a
"purely possessory" action, and that to the extent a judgment in ejectment purported to
vest title in either party it was coram, non judice and void. Id. at 160, 113 S.W.2d at 794.
Of course, a judgment which erroneously grants title relief when not sought by the
parties will nevertheless provide supreme court jurisdiction. This is because a decision
that the trial judgment was in error cannot be made until the appellate court has de-
termined its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes, 345 Mo. 958, 137 S.W.2d 544
(1940); Domyan v. Dornin, 348 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), trans'd, 356 S.W.2d
70 (Mo. 1962); see § 5.012, notes 13-14. Because a judgment in ejeetment does not
adjudicate the title of the parties, ejectment actions may be brought on the same facts
ad infinitum. Auldridge v. Spraggin, 349 Mo. 858, 163 S.W.2d 1042 (1942).
63. E.g., Auldridge v. Spraggin, supra note 62:
In order to prevent the harassment of successive actions in ejectment, a bill of
peace to quiet title was resorted to. . . . An exception was recognized when the
ejectment action was converted into an equitable action and an issue as to title was
injected and affirmative relief prayed for. Under such cases an adjudication be-
came binding.
Accord, Davidson v. Eubanks, 354 Mo. 301, 189 S.W.2d 295, frans'd from 185 S.W.2d
73 (Ct. App. 1945); Murphy v. Milby, 344 Mo. 1080, 130 S.W.2d 518 (1939); Gib-
bany v. Walker, 342 Mo. 156, 113 S.W.2d 792 (1938), discussed in text accompanying
note 61 supra; Welsh v. Brown, 339 Mo. 235, 96 S.W.2d 345 (1936) (defendant sought
title determination).
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The recent cases, following Ballenger and Gibbany, have denied supreme
court jurisdiction over simple ejectment actions.64 Since 1949, however,
the premise that judgment in simple ejectment is inconclusive has been
theoretically undermined. In that year the supreme court decided Cantrell
v. City of Caruthersville, in which, during the course of a non-jurisdictional
discussion of civil procedure, the court reasoned that in ejectment "the
judgment rendered should.., be binding [as to all claims of title and pos-
session] upon the parties and their privies."65 In this case plaintiff was ap-
pealing a judgment dismissing his suit to quiet title. The supreme court
stated that the dismissal had been correct because the plaintiff's action con-
cerned the same "subject matter" as a pending suit of simple ejectment
which had been previously filed by the city (the defendant in the instant
action) against the plaintiff. The supreme court's conclusion was derived
from its examination of the 1943 Code of Civil Procedure, which required
defendants to plead in actions filed against them all matters constituting af-
firmative defenses" or counterclaimsr  arising out of the same transactions
that gave rise to the claims against them. (The penalty for failure was a bar
to raising them in subsequent litigation.) The court reasoned that title is the
"subject matter" in actions of simple ejectment as well as in suits to quiet
titie and that the instant action therefore, fell within the intent of the
general assembly to avoid relitigation of issues.6"
64. E.g., Luttrell v. Highway Comm'n, 367 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. 1963), trans'd, 379
S.W.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1964); Corbin v. Galloway, 382 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964); Moore v. Rone, 355 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
65. 359 Mo. 282, 295, 221 S.W.2d 471, 479 (1949).
66. Mo. CODE CIV. P. § 40 (1943) (now Mo. REv. STAT. § 509.090 (1959)).
67. Mo. CODE CIV. P. § 73 (1943) (now Mo. Rav. STAT. § 509.420 (1959)).
68. The court failed to articulate clearly why the two statutes required that the judg-
ment in ejectment be conclusive upon the title issue raised. The following reasons for
this conclusiveness may be inferred from the opinion: (1) The intention of the legisla-
ture, as reflected by these two statutes, was to avoid relitigation of issues, and this in-
tention, applied to ejectment actions, requires a judgment conclusive on the title issues
raised. This application is only impliedly rather than expressly condoned by the terms
of the statutes. (2) If the defendant fails to assert all affirmative title counterclaims
and defenses, he will be deemed to have raised them, and they will be deemed to have
been conclusively adjudicated. If the second possibility was intended by the court, it
would seem that since the statutes discussed pertain only to defendants, the conclusive-
ness which the court derives should apply not to the action of ejectment itself, but only
to the defendants in such actions. That is, neither of the statutes precludes the plaintiff
in ejectment from relitigating the title issues in future actions.
The reasoning of Cantrell, if extended somewhat and accepted as valid authority,
could have a sweeping effect not only in ejectment actions, but on the general law of
appellate jurisdiction based upon title to real estate. If "subject matter" was interpreted to
mean the "primary issue" or the "basis of the cause of action" (as in Cantrell, e.g., title was
the basis of the non-title action for possession), the reasoning of Cantrell would require
that judgments be res judicata in all actions in which the pivotal issue of fact is the title
§ 5.070
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Expressing doubts that its view of the matter would accord with the cur-
rent sentiments of the Missouri Bar, the Cantrell opinion ascribed to its
reasoning a "prospective" effect only, and "in justice to appellants" re-
versed the judgment. The "prospective" reasoning has never been adverted
to by the court for the purpose of questioning the jurisdictional premise of
Ballenger and Gibbany, but it is a potential threat to that premise.
5.080. ACTIONS TO IMPRESS OR SET ASIDE LIENS ON REAL ESTATE
Title to real estate is not involved and the supreme court has no jurisdic-
tion in an action to establish a lien on real estate, whether a lien for a per-
sonal debt,e" mechanic's lien," tax bill," vendee's lien,"2 judgment lien' or
of the litigants upon which non-tifle relief is sought. At the present time these actions for
non-title relief fail to merit supreme court jurisdiction because the judgments do not
"affect" the title. The res 5udicata effect of Cantrell would cure that jurisdictional defect.
The potential effect of the Cantrell reasoning is particularly great in actions for tres-
pass and injunctions in which the primary factual issue at trial may be the title of the
parties, but in which the supreme court denies jurisdiction because the title is not con-
clusively affected. §§ 5.150 and 5.020, notes 17 & 19. Similar compulsory counterclaim
statutes have been applied in federal decisions in cases of injunction against trespass,
Carter Oil Co. v. Wood, 30 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Ill. 1940), and in trespass, Arizona Lead
Mines, Inc. v. Sullivan Mining Co., 3 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Idaho 1943). See Blackmar,
Some Problems Regarding Compulsory Counterclaims Under the Federal Rules and the
Missouri Code, 19 U. KAN. Crry L. Rmv. 38, 49 (1951). It has been argued that the
Cantrell rationale and "the 1943 Missouri Code of Civil Procedure should make a judg.
ment in trespass conclusive under the same sections that make a judgment in ejectment
conclusive." Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for 1949-Property, 15 Mo.
L. REv. 376, 382 (1950). (Emphasis added.) (This same author questions whether su-
preme court jurisdiction will still be denied in ejectment under the Cantrell decision. Id.
at 383.)
69. Schell v. Schell, 381 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1964), transd from 370 S.W.2d 816 (Ct.
App. 1963), retrans'd; Jine v. Jine, 217 S.W. 93 (Mo. 1919), trans'd, 226 S.W. 51 (Ct.
App. 1920); Chapman v. Chapman, 194 Mo. App. 483, 185 S.W. 221 (1916), rev'd on
other grounds, 269 Mo. 663, 192 S.W. 448 (1917).
70. Rust Sash & Door Co. v. Gates City Bldg. Corp., 342 Mo. 206, 114 S.W.2d
1023 (1937), trans'd, 124 S.W.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1939); Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v.
Lane, 205 S.W. 801 (Mo. 1918), trans'd sub nom. Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Bam-
brick Bros. Constr. Co., 211 S.W. 93 (Ct. App. 1919); P. M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v.
Klein, 170 Mo. 225, 70 S.W. 687 (1902), transd, 100 Mo. App. 289, 73 S.W. 313
(1903).
71. St. Ferdinand Sewer Dist. v. Turner, 356 Mo. 804, 203 S.W.2d 731 (1947),
trans'd, 208 S.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1948) (action to recover delinquent taxes, plaintiff
sought lien); Pearson Drainage Dist. v. Ehrhardt, 196 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1946), trans'd,
239 Mo. App. 845, 201 S.W.2d 484 (1947) (action to recover drainage taxes); Stumpe
v. City of Washington, 328 Mo. 1081, 43 S.W.2d 414 (1931) (en bane), trans'd, 54
S.W.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1932); City of St. Louis v. Dietering, 19 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1929),
trans'd, 27 S.W.2d 711 (1930); City of Laclede v. Libby, 278 S.W. 372 (Mo. 1925),
trans'd, 221 Mo. App. 703, 285 S.W. 178 (1926); Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hezel,
138 Mo. 228, 39 S.W. 781 (1897), trans'd, 76 Mo. App. 135 (1898); Bobb v. Wolf, 105
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deed of trust (or mortgage)." The courts of appeals also have jurisdiction
of appeals from actions to set aside liens other than deeds of trust (or mort-
gages)," to establish priority of liens,"" or seeking decrees of subrogation to
the rights of mortgagees." The supreme court's view that it has no jurisdic-
tion of "lien" cases is based upon two conclusions: (1) a lien is not title to
the fee, nor is it real estate, and (2) the judgment itself will not affect title,
even though enforcement of the lien in subsequent proceedings might divest
title.
A lien is only a charge on the land-a security interest not constituting
an interest in real estate.7" A lien may be a cloud on title but does not de-
prive the principal owner of the land or of any segment of fee simple title. "
The enforcement of the lien by execution and sale will divest the title
from the present holder. A possible future divestiture, however, will not
Mo. 52, 16 S.W. 835 (1891), trans'd, 54 Mo. App. 515 (1893) (seeking apportionment
of tax assessments among life tenants and remaindermen) ; Skrainka v. Allen, 2 Mo. App.
387 (1876).
72. McHolland v. Treadway, 328 Mo. 721, 41 S.W.2d 375 (1931), trans'd, 226 Mo.
App. 212, 45 S.W.2d 903 (1932).
73. Miller v. Heisler, 180 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1944), trans'd, 187 S.W.2d 485 (Ct. App.
1945); King v. Hayes, 319 Mo. 569, 4 S.W.2d 1062 (1928), discussed infra note 76.
74. E.g., Corbett v. Brown, 263 S.W. 233 (Mo. 1924), discussed infra note 124;
1 5.102(b). The term "'mortgage' includes deed of trust, vendor's lien, and chattel
mortgage." Mo. REv. STAT. § 472.010(23) (1959).
75. City of Marshfield ex rel. Hasten v. Brown, 337 Mo. 1136, 88 S.W.2d 339 (1936),
trans'd from 79 S.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1935), retrans'd, 99 S.W.2d 485 (1936) (cross-
bill sought to cancel tax bill); Gratz v. City of Kirkwood, 165 Mo. App. 196, 145 S.W.
870 (1912). Even though the supreme court does not have jurisdiction of appeals from
suits to establish mortgages, it does have jurisdiction of appeals involving suits to cancel.
For a full discussion and critique of this distinction, see §§ 5.102(a), (b) and 5.103.
76. Truesdale v. Brennan, 72 Mo. App. 547 (1897), transferred to the supreme court
a suit to establish a prior lien which was accepted without discussion, 153 Mo. 600, 55
S.W. 147 (1900). This decision was overruled in King v. Hayes, 319 Mo. 569, 4 S.W.2d
1062, trans'd, 223 Mo. App. 138, 9 S.W.2d 538 (1928), which held that a suit to estab-
lish priority was equivalent to a suit to establish a lien, and did not involve title to real
estate.
77. Lemmon v. Lincoln, 130 Mo. 335, 32 S.W. 662 (1895), trans'd, 68 Mo. App. 76
(1896). Plaintiff appealed a judgment denying his petition to have reinstated in his favor
certain liens alleged to have been discharged by plaintiff's funds. Jurisdiction was not in
the supreme court because the judgment would only have established liens on the land.
78. Miller v. Heisler, 180 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1944), trans'd, 187 S.W.2d 485 (Ct. App.
1945); State ex rel. Reed v. Elliot, 180 Mo. 658, 79 S.W. 696 (1904); Chapman v.
Chapman, 194 Mo. App. 483, 185 S.W. 221 (1916), rev'd on other grounds, 269 Mo.
663, 192 S.W. 448 (1917).
79. City of Marshfield ex rel. Hasten v. Brown, 337 Mo. 1136, 88 S.W.2d 339 (1936),
discussed supra note 75; see Smith v. City of Westport, 174 Mo. 394, 74 S.W. 610
(1903), trans'd, 105 Mo. App. 221, 79 S.W. 725 (1904); Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v.
Hezel, 138 Mo. 228, 39 S.W. 781 (1897), trans'd, 76 Mo. App. 135 (1898) ("cloud" on
title does not constitute a segment of title).
1 5.080
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss4/7
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
involve title because the judgment does not directly affect title, but only
grants or denies the lien sought." Also, many cases have noted that title
to real estate is not disputed, and hence not involved, because the party
seeking the lien must concede title in the other party if the lien is to attach.8
5.090. ACTIONS RELATING TO FORECLOSURE, EXECUTION AND SALE
The problems considered in actions relating to foreclosure, execution
and sale focus primarily upon the meaning of the involvement requirement.
The real estate interest under consideration is generally the fee simple, the
title to which is likely to be divested as a result of the proceedings.8 "
Whether there is an involvement of title to real estate is determined by con-
sidering the mechanics of foreclosure actions and sales and the position
of the title at each step.
80. The divestiture is contingent because the lien may be discharged by the payment
of money. Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Lane, 205 S.W. 801 (Mo. 1918), discussed supra;
note 70; Lemmon v. Lincoln, 130 Mo. 335, 32 S.W. 662 (1895), discussed supra note 77.
If the judgment is not satisfied, a subsequent foreclosure, judicial or execution sale will,
be necessary for divestiture of title, which is accomplished by delivery of the deed re-
salting from the sale. State ex tel. Reed v. Elliot, 180 Mo. 658, 79 S.W. 696 (1904),
trans'd, 114 Mo. App. 562, 90 S.W. 122 (1905); 1 PATTON, TITLEs § 481 (2d ed. 1957).
81. Stumpe v. City of Washington, 328 Mo. 1081, 43 S.W.2d 414 (1931), trans'd,
54 S.W.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1932); Jones v. Hogan, 211 Mo. 45, 109 S.W. 641 (1908),
trans'd, 135 Mo. App. 347, 116 S.W. 21 (1909); Stark v. Martin, 204 Mo. 433, 102 S.W.
1089, trans'd, 126 Mo. App. 575, 105 S.W. 33 (1907); Balz v. Nelson, 171 Mo. 682
(1903), transd from 86 Mo. App. 374 (1900). This reasoning presupposes that a lien is
not a segment of title to real estate, because the lien interest is disputed. See notes 78-79
supra.
82. It is important that the concepts of title and real estate be distinguished from in-
volvement in these cases, even though the main focus is upon the last. Snodgrass v. Cop.
ple, 203 Mo. 480, 101 S.W. 1090 (1907), trans'd, 131 Mo. App. 346, 111 S.W. 845
(1908), was an appeal from an order sustaining a motion to quash an execution on the
ground that the property came within the homestead exemption. The court first held
that the owner's title to the land would not be affected by the judgment. It then noted,
however, that the decision would determine defendant's right to a homestead and raised
the question whether this right constituted real estate as a question distinct from that of
involvement. The court answered in the negative. Judge Graves, in dissent, asserted that
a homestead right, while a mere exemption, is an interest in real estate, and that title to
that interest, as distinguished from title to the fee, was involved.
The title requirement should also be individually examined. Even when the title to
the fee is conceded in the defendant in an action to foreclose a deed of trust, if the
owner of the land attacks the validity of the deed of trust and seeks to set it aside, title
to real estate is involved, because the deed of trust is termed a "muniment" of title, and
to cancel it would determine that aspect of title. City of Marshfield ex rel. Hasten v.
Brown, 337 Mo. 1136, 88 S.W.2d 339 (1936), discussed supra note 75; accord, Little v.
Reid, 141 Mo. 242, 42 S.W. 674 (1897), transd, 75 Mo. App. 266 (1898), which noted,
that in that foreclosure action the defendant did not dispute the validity of the deed of
trust, implying that title would have been involved had there been such a dispute. See
§ 5.100 for discussion of muniments of title.
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5.091. Proceeding of Foreclosure and Execution
Title to real estate is not involved in suits to foreclose upon a mortgage
(deed of trust) 3 or to execute a lien"' since title to the fee simple is not
disputed, but is conceded at the time suit is filed to be in the defendant.8"
Furthermore, title is not affected by the judgment; only the later enforce-
ment by foreclosure or execution sale will divest title.
[T]itle to real estate is involved only in cases where the judgment di-
rectly affects the title, and [the constitution of Missouri] does not confer
jurisdiction [on the supreme court] simply because real estate is at-
tempted to be sold under a judgment which does not directly affect the
title. In other words, it is the judgment which must affect the title, and
not the enforcement of the judgment by a sale under execution to sat-
isfy a claim against one who concededly has the title ...
5.092. Actions to Enjoin Foreclosure and Sale
Since title will not be divested until the sale and delivery of the deed,
judgment in an action to enjoin a foreclosure or execution upon land will
83. Rust v. Geneva Inv. Co., 124 S.W.2d 1135 (Mo. 1939), trans'd, 235 Mo. App. 505,
136 S.W.2d 355 (1940); Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d
771, trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928) (en banc) (dictum); DuBow-
sky v. Binggelli, 258 Mo. 197, 167 S.W. 999, trans'd, 184 Mo. App. 361, 171 S.W. 12
(1914); Finch v. Edwards, 239 Mo. App. 788, 198 S.W.2d 665 (1947). The procedure
for filing a petition to foreclose a mortgage is recited in Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.190
(1959) which provides that the mortgagee set forth the substance of the mortgage and
pray that judgment be rendered for the debt secured by the mortgage, that the equity of
redemption be foreclosed and that the mortgaged property be sold. In addition to fore-
closures by suit, a mortgage may be foreclosed by a trustee's sale (Mo. Rv. STAT.
§ 443.410 (1959)) or, in the case of a mortgage with a power of sale, by the mortgagee
himself (Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.290 (1959); Note, 1950 WAsH. U.L.Q. 423).
84. Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, supra note 83; P. M. Bruner Granitoid v.
Klein, 170 Mo. 225, 70 S.W. 687 (1902), trans'd, 100 Mo. App. 289, 73 S.W. 313
(1903) (mechanic's Hen); see Snodgrass v. Copple, 203 Mo. 480, 101 S.W. 1090 (1907),
discussed supra note 82; Lawson v. Hammond, 191 Mo. 522, 90 S.W. 431 (1905),
trans'd from 102 Mo. App. 44, 81 S.W. 656 (1903), retrans'd, 119 Mo. App. 480, 94
S.W. 313 (1906) (suit to quash execution). An execution may be issued by the clerk on
"any judgment, order or decree" within ten years after its rendition. Mo. Rav. STAT.
§§ 513.015, .020 (1959). After issuance of the execution, the property of the defendant
is subject to levy, i.e., "seizure . . . by the officer charged with the execution of the writ"
(Mo. Rav. STAT. § 513.010 (1959)), and sale (Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 513.085, .100
(1959)).
85. Stark v. Martin, 204 Mo. 433, 102 S.W. 1089, trans'd, 126 Mo. App. 575, 105
S.W. 33 (1907); Finch v. Edwards, 239 Mo. App. 788, 198 S.W.2d 665, 672 (1947).
86. Lawson v. Hammond, 191 Mo. 522, 530, 90 S.W. 431, 433-34 (1905), trans'd
from 102 Mo. App. 44, 81 S.W. 656 (1903), retrans'd, 119 Mo. App. 480, 94 S.W. 313
(1906) (Emphasis added.); accord, Snodgrass v. Copple, 203 Mo. 480, 101 S.W. 1090
(1907), discussed supra note 82.
In foreclosure actions, the parties do not seek title "determination," which means a
final, binding effect upon the title issue. Harrel v. Surface, 349 Mo. 370, 160 S.W.2d
756, trane'd, 237 Mo. App. 155, 165 S.W.2d 322 (1942); see § 5.070.
J 5.091
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss4/7
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
not directly affect title;"7 the decree granting the injunction would be in
personam only and would not run with the land."8 Similarly, in suits to
enjoin a threatened sale of realty, title to real estate is not involved; title
remains in the debtor, at least for the time being, whether the decree is
granted or denied. 9
5.093. Proceedings to Set Aside Sales
In Missouri, title is passed not by the sale of land but only by delivery of
the deed, which may or may not occur concomitantly."' Therefore, if the
87. Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263, 10 S.W. 891 (1888); Leach v. Koenig, 55 Mo.
451 (1874); Patten v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. 1070, 25
S.W.2d 1075 (1930).
88. State ex rel. South Mo. Pine Lumber Co. v. Dearing, 180 Mo. 53, 79 S.W. 454
(1904).
89. Oehler v. Philpott, 253 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1952), trans'd, 225 S.W.2d 90 (Ct. App.
1953) (sale under power of sale in deed of trust); Farrell v. Seelig, 19 S.W.2d 648 (Mo.
1929) (trustee's sale); Weil v. Richardson, 320 Mo. 310, 7 S.W.2d 348 (1928), dis-
cussed supra note 18; State ex rel. Haeussler v. Court of Appeals, 67 Mo. 199 (1877);
Maender v. Breck, 159 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (sheriff's sale under execution);
Madden v. Fitzsimmons, 235 Mo. App. 1074, 150 S.W.2d 761 (1941) (sheriff's sale under
execution); Swan v. Thompson, 36 Mo. App. 155 (1889) (sale by public administrator
pursuant to order of probate court). If additional affirmative title relief is sought, an ap-
peal from a judgment denying it will involve title to real estate. Gardner v. Terry, 99
Mo. 523, 12 S.W. 888 (1890).
In Weil v. Richardson, supra, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin execution (on land) upon
a judgment for services rendered a corporation, claiming in the alternative that (1) they
held title by deed from the corporation (judgment debtor) and (2) the judgment for
services rendered was void because the corporate charter had been forfeited (contentions
which the dissenting opinion noted were inconsistent). The defendant creditor sought to
cancel the deed to the plaintiffs as fraudulent upon creditors. The trial court made no
finding on the validity of the conveyance, holding the original judgment void because of
the invalidity of the corporate charter, and enjoined the sale. On appeal the majority
opinion failed to make clear whether the defendant preserved his claim to cancel the
deed in addition to appealing the injunction based upon the invalidity of the charter, but
the dissent indicates that this affirmative title relief claim had been preserved. The ma-
jority opinion did not advert to the fact that such relief sought by defendant would
involve title, and retransferred the cause to the court of appeals, viewing it as "at most
nothing more than an action to prevent the lien of the judgment being enforced against
the real estate in question." Id. at 315, 7 S.W.2d at 351. See § 5.012. For a criticism
of Weil see Comment, Courts-Appellate Jurisdiction in Missouri in Cases Involving,
Title to Real Estate, 41 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 30, 39 (1930). For an extended discus-
sion of claims for injunctive relief, see § 5.150.
90. Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263, 10 S.W. 891 (1888); Leach v. Koenig, 55
Mo. 451 (1874); Patten v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. 1070, 25
S.W.2d 1075 (1930).
While Missouri courts have not so held, it is possible that the sale would pass to the
purchaser an "equitable title," including the right to have the legal title conveyed to
him upon performance of any unfulfilled conditions of the sale. 2 PATToN, TrrLps § 481
(1957). If this "equitable title" were construed as title for jurisdictional purposes, the
judgment setting aside a sale would divest this.
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deed had not been delivered, a suit to set aside a sale would not have the
effect of reconveying title. However, the location of title and the possible
effect of judgment upon title in a proceeding to set aside the sale are not
clearly analyzed by the courts.
By the present rule, as expressed in State ex rel. Reed v. Elliott,9 the
supreme court has no jurisdiction of appeals from orders of the circuit court
sustaining or overruling motions to set aside sales.92 Rather than discussing
whether title has passed previous to the motion, the courts appear to test
jurisdiction according to whether the judgment sought upon institution of
the original action, out of which the instant proceeding emerged, could have
directly affected title. In Elliott the court reasoned that title was not in-
volved because the original action in circuit court was only in personam to
recover a debt. Although only a lien was imposed by the original judgment
in favor of the creditor, a new element may have been injected into the
proceeding by the motion to set aside the post-judgment sale. If a deed had
been delivered and title had passed previous to the filing of the motion, it
appears that a matter of title would have been injected into the proceedings.
The court, however, apparently disregarded this possibility.
In cases in which the original proceedings were in a court inferior to the
circuit court-to order a sale in probate court or to impress and foreclose
a lien in a magistrate (justice of the peace) court-primary significance is
91. 180 Mo. 658, 79 S.W. 696 (1904), trans'd, 114 Mo. App. 562, 90 S.W. 122
(1905).
92. State ex rel. Ross v. Martin, 338 Mo. 1067, 93 S.W.2d 911, trans'd, 99 S.W.2d
875 (Ct. App. 1936) (appeal from order of circuit court setting aside sale under;
special execution); Bank of Forest City v. Pettijohn, 338 Mo. 506, 92 S.W.2d 189,
trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 139, 99 S.W.2d 154 (1936) (appeal from circuit court decree dis-
approving administrator's private sale of realty to pay debts).
The early cases caused considerable difficulty. In McAnaw v. Matthis, 129 Mo. 142,
31 S.W. 344 (1895), trans'd from court of appeals, the trial court set aside the sale.
Plaintiff's appeal to the Kansas City Court of Appeals was transferred to the supreme
court, Division One, which accepted jurisdiction summarily. In Stinson v. Call, 163 Mo.
323, 63 S.W. 729 (1901), Division Two followed McAnaw just as summarily, upon plain-
tiff's appeal from an order sustaining the defendant's motion to set aside a sale of de-
fendant's land on execution. Then the supreme court, Division One, in State ex rel.
Reed v. Elliott, discussed text accompanying note 91 supra, overruled McAnaw. On ap-
peal from an order to set aside a sheriff's sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, the court
reviewed the reasoning in actions to establish liens and suits to set aside foreclosures
and writs of execution, concluding that "McAnaw v. Matthis was not even a suit to fasten
a lien on real estate. It was a plain action, in personam, to recover a debt, and did not
involve title to real estate ... ." Id. at 660, 79 S.W. at 697. In Lawson v. Hammond,
191 Mo. 522, 90 S.W. 431 (1905), trans'd from 102 Mo. App. 44, 81 S.W. 656 (1903),
retrans'd, 119 Mo. App. 480, 94 S.W. 313 (1906), the court expressly overruled Stinson
v. Call, supra.
1 5.093
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attached to the fact that the inferior court lacked jurisdiction to try title.0"
Even though it is possible that in the appeal from the minor court to the
circuit court a title issue is introduced, these cases have not described the
effect of the instant judgment upon, and the parties' dispute of, title. Thus
the jurisdictional reasoning is incomplete, as is suggested by the court of
appeals in Bank of Forest City v. Pettijohn:
The defendant argues that. . . the circuit court had no jurisdiction
save "over matters fought out and litigated in the probate court." The
circuit court proceeded as though it had original jurisdiction... and
was not influenced by the finding and order of the probate court. This
was the proper procedure. 4
Thus the jurisdiction of the probate or magistrate court does not control
that of the circuit and appellate courts, and should not be the controlling
criterion of involvement of title in appeals from motions to set aside sales in
circuit courts.
A possible explanation of the courts' reasoning is a belief that the dispute
93. In State ex rel. Reed v. Elliott, 180 Mo. 658, 79 S.W. 696 (1904), trans'd, 114
Mo. App. 562, 90 S.W. 122 (1905), the judgment and execution occurred at the circuit
court level, which 'did have title jurisdiction. But in its overruling of McAnaw v. Matthis,
supra note 92, the court gave operative significance to the fact that in McAnaw an execu-
tion levied upon a personal judgment in a justice of the peace court for a debt had been
appealed to the circuit court and there dismissed. Since no deed had been executed in
Elliott, and thus the judgment setting aside the sale could not possibly do anything but
leave the title in the debtor, the jurisdictional result seems correct. It is suggested, how-
ever, that the result should have been based expressly on this lack of effect on title, rather
than on a discussion of the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals.
In Bank of Forest City v. Pettijohn, 338 Mo. 506, 92 S.W.2d 189, trans'd, 231 Mo.
App. 139, 99 S.W.2d 154 (1936), the appeal was from an order of the circuit court, on
a creditor's appeal from the probate court, setting aside an administrator's sale which had
been approved by the probate court, at which sale a deed had been delivered to the pur-
chaser. The purchaser appealed to the supreme court. Since the purchaser was a party to
the instant action, it is possible that the respondent creditor sought to destroy his record
title. The court did not account for this possibility. The court noted "this case originated
in the probate court of Holt county," and then denied jurisdiction, apparently on the
ground that since the probate court order and approval of the sale could not have af-
fected title, this second appeal therefrom also could not affect title. It is suggested
that the court's reasoning is incomplete, because of failure to consider whether a title
issue was injected into the case at the circuit court level. The court also said that since
the probate court action did not dispute the title, this subsequent proceeding did not.
This reasoning is also incomplete: it does not account for the position of title at the
time of the action to set aside the sale.
94. 231 Mo. App. 139, 142-43, 99 S.W.2d 154, 157, trans'd from 338 Mo. 506, 92
S.W.2d 189 (1936). The supreme court had transferred to the court of appeals using
the reasoning that appellate and circuit court jurisdiction was circumscribed by that of
the probate court.
It is reasonable to assume, of course, that if a deed had passed and was attacked, the
courts would advert to those facts, so the jurisdictional decisions are probably correct.
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on appeal from an action to set aside a sale concerns not the title but only
the validity of the sale. As was circuitously stated in Williams v. Luecke:
Conceding that title to real estate would have been incidentally affected
if the court had sustained the motion [to set aside a sale], such question
was nevertheless not directly involved in the case as it is required to be
in order to invest appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.... The
issue involved on the merits of the motion was the validity of the sale,
and not the title acquired by plaintiff [the purchaser at the sale], about
which there was no controversy if the sale itself was valid.... ."
Since a deed had been executed to the plaintiff purchaser, and the motion
by the defendant to set aside the sale was directed against the purchaser, it
would appear from the very reasoning of the court that an attack on the
sale concomitantly assailed the validity of the title; this point was not clari-
fied by the court.
5.094. Actions Seeking Redemption
If the grantor of a deed of trust gives written notice and a surety bond
at the sale or within specified periods thereafter, he has the right to satisfy
the obligation secured by the deed of trust at any time within a period of
one year after the sale." Although earlier cases reached a contrary result,97
it is now settled that a judgment of redemption will not affect title because
it merely declares the redemption and prevents a future divestment by de-
livery of the deed to the purchaser. 8 However, in any action for redemp-
95. 152 S.W.2d 991, 993 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941).
96. Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 443.410-.440 (1959). For a discussion of the rights acquired
by redemption, see 2 PATTON, TrrLEs § 483 (1957).
97. Keith v. Browning, 139 Mo. 190, 40 S.W. 764 (1897); Sturgeon v. Mudd, 190
Mo. 200, 88 S.W. 630 (1905), were suits to redeem real estate sold under power of sale
in a mortgage which were decided by the supreme court without discussion of jurisdiction.
Two later cases seeking redemption were summarily accepted. Casebolt v. Courtney, 177
Mo. App. 414, 162 S.W. 1045 (1914), tran'd, 195 S.W. 746 (Mo. 1917) (court of ap-
peals stated that judgment could divest title and supreme court accepted jurisdiction
without comment); House v. Clarke, 171 Mo. App. 242, 156 S.W. 495 (1913), trans'd,
187 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1916) (court of appeals followed Casebolt without discussion).
98. Casner v. Schwartz, 276 S.W. 58 (Mo. 1925), transd, 286 S.W. 401 (Ct. App.
1926), is a transitional decision. Comment, 41 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 30, 36 (1930). The
court held that a redemption is effected by the payment of money within a specified
time, not by the judgment of the court. White v. Huffman, 301 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1957),
clearly held that a judgment of redemption does not affect title but only determines
plaintiff's right to redeem. The court in the White case distinguished the Casebolt
and House cases, supra note 97, as suits to redeem "by setting aside the foreclosure
sale." 301 S.W. at 826. By this it is implied that title was considered "involved"
if cancellation of the sale was sought. However, in view of the decisions holding that
suits to cancel sales do not "involve title to real estate" (§ 5.093), the Casebolt and
House cases are no longer valid authority.
§ 5.094
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tion in which cancellation of a sheriff's deed or a trustee's deed is sought,
title to real estate would be involved.9
5.100. ACTIONS CONCERNING MUNIMENTS OF TITLE
The failure of the courts to analyze the concepts of title, real estate, and
involvement has led to inconsistencies in the cases concerning muniments of
title.
5.101. The Muniment as Title to Real Estate
A muniment is an instrument evidencing the title or ownership of real
estate."'0 If the validity of a muniment is attacked, the title to real estate
purportedly evidenced thereby is necessarily disputed." Hence the su-
preme court has been held to have jurisdiction when a party assails a war-
ranty deed,"0 2 a quitclaim deed,' a sheriff's deed,"0 4 a trustee's deed, ", or
a decree purporting to vest title in one of the parties. 08
99. See § 5.091, notes 84-85. A case of this nature was Leone v. Bear, 362 Mo. 464,
241 S.W.2d 1008 (1951) (to cancel trustee's deed), but the court made no express juris-
dictional finding. The supreme court's acceptance of the case leads to the conclusion that
when a deed has passed, title is involved in a redemption action seeking to set aside the
record title of the purchaser.
100. BLAci, LAW DICTIONARY 1170 (4th ed. 1951).
101. Hanna v. South St. Joseph Land Co., 126 Mo. 1, 10, 28 S.W. 652, 654 (1894)
(action to set aside deed of trust): "From these rulings it would seem to follow that,
where a muniment of title to real estate is directly assailed and sought to be canceled,
this court has jurisdiction . *..." Accord, Pelz v. Bollenger, 87 Mo. App. 540 (1901),
trans'd, 180 Mo. 252, 79 S.W. 146 (1904). This was an action to vacate a judgment
purporting to vest title in the defendant, alleging it was procured by fraud. The court
stated: "The decree sought to be vacated for fraud in its concoction is a muniment of
title. Necessarily, therefore, a determination of the issues herein joined directly involves
the title to real estate." Id. at 541.
102. E.g., Jones v. Davis, 306 S.W.2d 479 (Mo.), trans'd from 301 S.W.2d 881 (Ct.
App. 1957); Green v. Wilks, 109 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1937) (defendant attacked war-
ranty deed, discussed as muniment of title); Nordquist v. Nordquist, 278 S.W. 810 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1926), trans'd, 321 Mo. 1244, 14 S.W.2d 583 (1929); McKinney v. Hawkins,
192 S.W. 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917), trans'd, 215 S.W. 250 (Mo. 1919).
103. E.g., Thomas v. Scott, 214 Mo. 430, 113 S.W. 1093 (1908) (en banc) (suit to
establish a quitclaim deed, discussed as a muniment of title); Curators of Cent. College
v. Shields, 182 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944), trans'd, 354 Mo. 132, 188 S.W.2d 835
(1945).
104. E.g., Shearer v. Shearer, 363 Mo. 1127, 257 S.W.2d 636 (1953) (action to set
aside sheriff's deed, appeal accepted without analysis); Massey v. Fitzpatrick, 175 S.W.2d
780 (Mo. 1943).
105. Starr v. Mitchell, 231 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950), trans'd, 361 Mo. 908,
237 S.W.2d 123 (1951); Cordia v. Matthes, 122 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938),
trans'd, 344 Mo. 1059, 130 S.W.2d 597 (1939) (court stated that trustee's deed is
muniment of title).
106. Pelz v. Bollenger, 87 Mo. App. 540 (1901), discussed supra note 101.
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When the instrument ceases to be evidence of title, as when the interest
in real estate described in the deed has been sold to a bona fide purchaser
who cannot be reached by the judgment, a suit to attack the instrument's
prior validity in order to establish a prior interest in the land will not affect
title; the instrument is no longer a muniment of title?.°
Inconsistency arises in the cases in which the challenged instrument evi-
dences an interest which does not constitute real estate. Although mort-
gages or deeds of trust evidence only lien interests,"0 8 in most jurisdictional
determinations they are loosely treated as representing a segment of title
to real estate." 9 For the purpose of discussing the "involvement" require-
ment, it must be granted arguendo that a mortgage or deed of trust is a
muniment of title for some purposes.
5.102. "Involvement" of a Muniment
Actions to set aside, to establish and to reform muniments are examined
separately to facilitate discussion of the differentiations made by the courts
between the types of action involving muniments, and to illustrate incon-
sistencies in the jurisdictional results. The courts make these differentiations
only when mortgages or deeds of trust are at issue, not when absolute deeds
(such as warranty deeds and quitclaim deeds") are at issue. Absolute
107. In Mitchell v. McClelland, 306 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957), the petitioner
sought to cancel two warranty deeds as fraudulent upon creditors. Title was in a third
party buyer from a prior judicial sale, and it could not be reached. Therefore, the plain-
tiff sought the cancellation only in order to recover a portion of the proceeds from the
sale. Jurisdiction was in the court of appeals. Accord, Nevins v. Coleman, 198 Mo.
App. 252, 200 S.W. 445 (1918) (action to reform deed of trust upon land previously
sold at foreclosure sale, title held not involved).
108. Park Nat'l Bank v. Travelers Indem. Co., 90 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Mo.), appeal
dismissed, 184 F.2d 672 (1950) (mortgage discussed); Eurengy v. Equitable Realty
Corp., 341 Mo. 341, 107 S.W.2d 68 (1937) (mortgage discussed); In re Title Guar.
Trust Co., 113 S.W.2d 1053 (Mo. App. 1938) (mortgage and deed of trust discussed);
Pence v. Gabbert's Adm'r, 70 Mo. App. 201 (1897) (discussion of evolvement of mort-
gage from common law "title" theory to present day treatment as lien only); see note 74
supra.
109. E.g., Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 218 S.W.2d 624 (1949) (en banc):
"From these decisions it will be seen that where the essential validity of the mortgage it-
self is in dispute, title is involved. In other words, the mortgage is regarded as a part of
segment of the title, constituting a cloud on title if it is invalid." Id. at 963, 218 S.W.2d
at 626.
110. An "absolute deed" is here considered as one which conveys an actual interest
in land, as opposed to the lien granted by a mortgage or a deed of trust. See BLACK,
LAw DICTIONARY 22-23 (4th ed. 1951). As will be later discussed, the term "deed of
trust" is perhaps a misnomer because no interest in real estate other than a security inter-
est is passed thereby. Note 108 supra and accompanying text.
§ 5.102
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deeds, however, cannot be omitted from the discussion because much of
the effect analysis is applicable to both absolute deeds and mortages, and
because absolute deeds are necessary for comparison of reasoning.
5.102 (a). Actions to Set Aside Muniments
When a party seeks to cancel a muniment, there are two lines of decision.
If either party contends that any muniment is void ab initio, title to real
estate is generally held to be "involved." ' If, however, the original validity
of a mortgage or a deed of trust is not in question, jurisdiction on appeal is
in the court of appeals. 12 Thus, when a party seeks to set aside an absolute
deed, mortgage or deed of trust because of the lack of consideration"' or
delivery," 4 because it was procured or executed by fraud,"'5 or on the
111. E.g., Cobble v. Garrison, 219 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1949) (trust deed); Kleber v.
Carlos, 202 S.W.2d 865 (1947); Woodbury v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo.
527, 166 S.W.2d 552 (1942) (deed of trust); Phillips v. Phoenix Trust Co., 332 Mo. 327,
58 S.W.2d 318 (1933) (deeds of trust); Koewing v. Greene County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
327 Mo. 680, 38 S.W.2d 40 (1931); Caneer v. Kent, 108 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. Ct. App.
1937), trans'd, 342 Mo. 878, 119 S.W.2d 214 (1938).
112. Boesel v. Perry, 262 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1953), transd to court of appeals (juris-
diction in court of appeals when original validity of deed of trust not attacked); Peters
v. Kirkwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 344 Mo. 1067, 130 S.W.2d 507 (1939), trans'd,
136 S.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1940); Farrell v. Seelig, 19 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1929), trans'd,
27 S.W.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1930); Puthoff v. Walker, 239 S.W. 108 (Mo. 1922), trans'd,
213 Mo. App. 228, 248 S.W. 619 (1923). It is important to note here that the distinc-
tion according to the time when the deed is alleged to have been invalid is only mean-
ingful when deeds of trust and mortgages are being examined, and has no application
to absolute deeds. That is, the means by which a deed becomes invalid, i.e., satisfaction
of the debt or merger of the mortgage with the fee, have no application to absolute deeds.
(Although it is conceivable that an absolute deed, once valid, could lose its validity by
adverse possession of another party, no such cases were found. It is thus possible that
the court would apply the jurisdictional distinction to such cases, but no opinion can be
given on this possibility.)
113. Cobble v. Garrison, 219 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1949); Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo.
959, 218 S.W.2d 624 (1948) (en banc) (deed of trust).
114. Koewing v. Greene County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 327 Mo. 680, 38 S.W.2d 40
(1931) (deed of trust).
115. Bitzenburg v. Bitzenburg, 360 Mo. 70, 226 S.W.2d 1017 (1950) (deeds of
trust); Green v. Wilks, 109 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1937) (warranty deeds); Overton v.
Overton, 131 Mo. 559, 33 S.W. 1 (1895) (deeds of trust); Tressler v. Whitsett, 280
S.W. 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926), tran'd, 321 Mo. 849, 12 S.W.2d 723 (1928) (deed of
trust); Soehngen v. Jantzen, 218 S.W. 423 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 222 S.W. 401 (Mo.
1920) (deed of trust); Schroeder v. Turpin, 138 Mo. App. 320, 122 S.W. 1 (1909)1
trans'd, 253 Mo. 258, 161 S.W. 716 (1913); Reed v. Colp, 74 S.W. 422 (Mo. Ct. App.
1903), trans'd, 213 Mo. 577, 112 S.W. 255 (1908) (deed of trust); Lappin v. Crawford,
92 Mo. App. 453 (1902), trans'd, 186 Mo. 462, 85 S.W. 535 (1905) (deed of trust);
Turner v. Overall, 83 Mo. App. 378 (1900), trans'd to supreme court (deed of trust).
For jurisdictional purposes, the courts do not distinguish between a deed fraudulently
executed and a deed fraudulently induced or procured. They are treated as void ab initio
in either case.
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ground of forgery or the grantor's mental incapacity,11 jurisdiction belongs
in the supreme court. The supreme court has jurisdiction, even though it
is claimed the conveyance is void only as to creditors."' If, however, the
original validity of a mortgage or deed of trust is not attacked, and a party
prays cancellation on the ground that the secured debt has been satisfied,'
or that rights under the deed of trust have been extinguished by a merger," '
jurisdiction belongs in the court of appeals.
In view of the common effect of the judgment sought in both cases, it is
difficult to distinguish suits to declare invalidity ab initio from actions to
cancel because of events subsequent to execution of the instrument. Any
valid distinction between questions of original and subsequent validity must
lie in the courts' interpretation of the dispute requirement. In Christopher
v. People's Home & Sav. Ass'n,"'2 plaintiffs, concededly the owners of the
land in question, sought to cancel a deed of trust held by the defendant,
claiming that the debt had been satisfied. The supreme court denied juris-
diction of plaintiffs' appeal because the original validity of the deed of trust
was not attacked. In distinguishing this case from one attacking the deed
of trust ab initio, the court noted that the title was not disputed, because
116. Gruetzmacher v. Hainey, 373 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1963); Walker v. Thompson, 338
S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1960).
117. Jones v. Davis, 306 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1957), discussed supra note 102 (warranty
deed); Garrison v. Schmicke, 354 Mo. 1185, 193 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1946) (warranty
deed); Belleville Casket Co. v. Brueggeman, 353 Mo. 357, 182 S.W.2d 555 (1944);
Herriman v. Creason, 352 Mo. 1176, 181 S.W.2d 502 (1944); Brennecke v. Riemann,
102 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1937); Hendrix v. Goldman, 92 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1936) (deed of
trust). In all these actions it was claimed the conveyances were fraudulent as to creditors,
and should be set aside. But cf. Klingelhoefer v. Smith, 171 Mo. 455, 71 S.W. 1008
(1903) (en banc), trans'd.
118. Peters v. Kirkwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 344 Mo. 1067, 130 S.W.2d 507
(1939), discussed supra note 112; Farrell v. Seelig, 19 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1929), discussed
supra note 112; Steffen v. Stahl, 266 S.W. 474 (Mo. 1924), trans'd, 273 S.W. 118 (Ct.
App. 1925); Puthoff v. Walker, 239 S.W. 108 (Mo. 1922), discussed supra note 112;
Vandeventer v. Florida Say. Bank, 232 Mo. 618, 135 S.W. 23, trans'd, 162 Mo. App. 34,
141 S.W. 900 (1911); Bonner v. Lisenby, 157 Mo. 165, 57 S.W. 735 (1900), trans'd
from 73 Mo. App. 562 (1898), retrans'd, 86 Mo. App. 666 (1901); Vandergrif v. Brock,
158 Mo. 681, 59 S.W. 979 (1900), trans'd from 73 Mo. App. 646 (1898), retrans'd, 89
Mo. App. 411 (1901).
119. Morgan v. York, 337 Mo. 1076, 88 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1935), trans'd from 61
S.W.2d 972 (Ct. App. 1933), retrans'd, 91 S.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1936) (plaintiff
claimed deed of trust extinguished by merger when holder of notes held equitable title to
land); accord, Boesel v. Perry, 262 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1953), trans'd to court of appeals
(plaintiff claimed rights under deed of trust extinguished when its holder executed quit-
claim deed to him); Hardwicke v. Barnes, 253 Mo. 6, 161 S.W. 744 (1913), trans'd, 179
Mo. App. 386, 166 S.W. 826 (1914), in which the plaintiff, who executed a deed of
trust as surety for the debt of another, claimed the interests under the deed of trust were
extinguished when the payment was extended without notice to him.
120. 180 Mo. 568, 79 S.W. 899 (1904).
1 5.102 (a)
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the plaintiffs concededly owned the land. The court, however, expressed
a distinction without a difference: ownership of the land will not be dis-
puted whether the deed of trust is challenged as void ab initio or because it
has been extinguished by satisfaction of the debt.
If a valid claim is made that the secured dept has been satisfied, the in-
terest under the deed has been extinguished by the satisfaction, and the
decree cancelling the deed of trust will only declare the fact of prior ex-
tinction.12' When the original validity of the muniment is attacked, how-
ever, the claim is made that the holder of the muniment never received an
interest; cancellation of the instrument is only declaratory of the fact that
its execution was of no effect. This declaration is substantially identical to
a declaration of subsequent extinction. It is submitted that this distinction
-the difference in point of time before the action at which the validity of
the instrument is disputed and adjudicated-should not provide a basis for
differing jurisdictional results.'22
121. The existence, or non-existence, the payment or the non-payment of the
original debt secured, was the issue around which the controversy centered, and if
upon this issue the court's final conclusion is that plaintiffs' obligation has been
paid, the deed of trust represents nothing to defendant, and the final decree order-
ing its cancellation becomes a matter to it [the defendant] of no concern, and affects
not an iota its interest in the land therein named; and if upon the other hand the
court's final determination is that plaintiffs' debt to defendant has not been fully
paid, the proceeding herein is simply dismissed. Id. at 572-73, 79 S.W. at 900.
Also by this language the court stated as another ground for its holding that the
original validity of the deed of trust was conceded by the parties throughout the contro-
versy, and that the sole issue was the payment of the note which if established would
render ineffective the deed of trust. This reasoning is questionable because the two issues
are concomitant, not separable. Since validity of the deed of trust depends on its not
being satisfied, that validity is assailed when it is claimed the debt was satisfied.
122. This distinction is inconsistent with the normal requirement that title only be
disputed as of the time of filing the action. See § 5.130. When an easement is sought by
prescriptive user, the parties also concede the full validity of defendant's original title
and it is asserted that at some time after the defendant acquired his title, but before the
action was insituted, the defendant's title was reduced by the occurrence of certain opera-
tive facts. But in easement cases, title is properly disputed for supreme court jurisdiction.
§ 5.120.
In Boesel v. Perry, 262 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1953), discussed supra note 112, the plain.
tiff sought to set aside a deed of trust, alleging that all rights under the instrument, con-
cededly valid originally, had been extinguished. The court noted the absence of a claim
that the deed of trust was void ab initio, and held that title was not involved because
plaintiff's prayer was but an effort to terminate the originally valid lien of the deed of
trust. It would seem, however, that the deed of trust conveyed only a lien, whether it is
attacked as void originally or only subsequently; the distinction is therefore invalid. The
same reasoning was used also in Morgan v. York, 337 Mo. 1076, 88 S.W.2d 146 (1935),
discussed supra note 119; Milby v. Murphy, 121 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
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5.102(b). Actions to Establish a Muniment of Title
Title is "involved" for jurisdictional purposes when a party seeks to estab-
lish an absolute deed."5 Jurisdictional problems exist only in actions to
establish mortgages or deeds of trust; by denying supreme court jurisdiction
in such actions, the courts appear to reach a result inconsistent with actions
to set aside these instruments. In Corbett v. Brown,"2 the plaintiff sought
to set aside a prior cancellation of-and thus to re-establish-a deed of
trust. The plaintiff alleged undue influence in procuring the cancellation.
The supreme court refused jurisdiction, comparing the case to those in
which parties seek to set aside deeds of trust alleged to have been satisfied.
The court noted, as it has in "satisfaction" cases, that neither of the parties
contested the original validity of the deed of trust, nor was the present
validity of the deed disputed.' This latter assertion seems erroneous. The
plaintiff claimed the deed of trust was still valid due to the wrongful can-
cellation, and both aspects of this assertion were denied by the defendant.
The court bolstered its holding by stating that the plaintiff sought only
the re-establishment of the lien of the deed of trust. But the court could
apply the same reasoning to actions to set aside as well as to establish a
deed of trust so that neither would involve title to real estate. 26
Of parallel significance are cases in which a party seeks to set aside a
release of a deed of trust. In Dubowsky v. Binggelli,"' the court denied
that title to real estate was involved, stating: "Plaintiff merely sued to es-
123. In Thomas v. Scott, 214 Mo. 430, 113 S.W. 1093 (1908) (en bane), the plain-
tiff sought to establish a quitclaim deed alleged to have been executed to him by the
defendant, which the plaintiff asserted had been lost or destroyed. The court reasoned
that if the title is involved in striking down a muniment of title, it should be involved
when the muniment is sought to be established: "How can it be said that the establish-
ment of a deed conveying the whole title to a tract of land by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction, a decree which the statute provides shall be conclusive of such
fact, does not affect the title to such real estate? We think it obvious that it does." Id.
at 437, 113 S.W. at 1096. The statute referred to was Mo. Laws 1873, § 2 at 48. It is
noteworthy that a decree in favor of the plaintiff in this case would not take title from
one litigant and give it to another, as is often stated to be necessary for "involvement,"
but will only establish a deed which had passed the title prior to the action.
124. 263 S.W. 233 (Mo.), transd, 266 S.W. 996 (Ct. App. 1924).
125. Id. at 234.
126. See note 133 infra. See also Steffen v. Stahl, 266 S.W. 474 (Mo. 1924), trans'd,
273 S.W. 118 (Ct. App. 1925), holding that title to real estate was not involved in a suit
to set aside a fraudulent satisfaction of a deed of trust because the only issue was whether
the note was discharged through a valid gift or surrender, and as a result, the lien of the
deed of trust extinguished. But see note 109 supra, to the effect that a deed of trust is a
segment of the title.
127. 258 Mo. 197, 167 S.W. 999, trans'd, 184 Mo. App. 361, 171 S. W. 12 (1914);
accord, Simmon v. Marion, 358 Mo. 888, 217 S.W.2d 537 (1949) (en banc), trans'd,
227 S.W.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1950).
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tablish a lien against the real estate of the defendants."' 28 Therefore, the
courts express differing views according to the form of the action: in an
action for establishment of a deed of trust, the interest is viewed as a mere
lien, but in an action for cancellation of a deed of trust, it is treated as title
to real estate. 2"
5.102(c). Actions to Reform a Muniment
Generally title to real estate is "involved" in a suit to reform a deed if the
judgment appealed concerns a disputed interest in real estate."' 0 However,
even though title may be disputed, it is not affected by the judgment in an
action seeking reformation in order to obtain only a lien on real estate,"' or
to obtain damages;.. jurisdiction belongs in the court of appeals.
5.103. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust as "Title to Real Estate"
The decisions that the supreme court has jurisdiction of appeals from
suits to cancel but not to establish deeds of trust and mortgages are based
upon an inconsistent view of the interest conveyed by such an instrument.
Although it is established that a deed of trust or mortgage is "simply a lien
or security, and does not pass title to realty,"'33 in cancellation actions the
cases have held that a mortgage or deed of trust is a "segment" of the
title. 4 No compelling reason for retention of such a distinction exists.
128. 258 Mo. at 200, 167 S.W. at 1000. See also Simmon v. Marion, 358 Mo. 888,
217 S.W.2d 537 (1949). But cf. Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 218 S.W.2d 624
(1949).
129. See notes 111-17 supra and accompanying text.
130. Phillips v. Cope, 104 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 111 S.W.2d 81 (Mo.
1937).
131. See McBee v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 235 S.W.2d 283 (Mo.), trans'd, 241 Mo.
App. 404, 238 S.W.2d 685 (1951) (to reform deed in order to declare lien on insurance
proceeds).
132. Heath v. Beck, 225 S.W. 993 (Mo. 1920), trans'd from 204 S.W. 43 (Ct. App.
1918), retrans'd, 231 S.W. 657 (Ct. App. 1921) (action for reformation of warranty
deed to incorporate agreement to afford outlet and damages for breach); Nevins v. Cole-
man, 198 Mo. App. 252, 200 S.W. 445 (1918) (suit seeking to reform deed of trust and
obtain damages for alleged wrongful negotiation of note secured thereby).
133. In In re Thomasson's Estate, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553 (1943), the court
said that "a suit to cancel a mortgage does not make a title controversy (unless on
the ground of fraud and if affirmative title relief is prayed)." Id. at 1176, 171 S.W.2d at
563. It is submitted, however, that the jurisdictional defect is intrinsic to the instrument
-it does not evidence an estate in land-and is not dependent upon the ground on
which the instrument is attacked.
134. In Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 963, 218 S.W.2d 624, 626 (1949) (en
bane), discussed supra note 109, an action to set aside a deed of trust, it was said: "In
other words, the mortgage is regarded as a part or segment of the title, constituting a
cloud on the title if it is invalid." The second half of this statement is relied upon to
establish the first half. But a cloud or incumbrance on title does not necessarily consti-
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5.104. The In Rem Statutes and the Effect Requirement
In order for title to real estate to be involved, the judgment must directly
affect the title. In an action to cancel a muniment of title, this effect is the
cancellation.
On the strictest equitable principles such a suit might be considered
solely one to destroy the particular deed, which is but evidence of legal
title. However, the chancery courts frequently required a reconveyance
by the defendant in such cases to do equity between the parties, rather
than a mere cancellation. This seems to have been the theory of the
Missouri courts as to the proper decree, for it has been held that under
the in rem statute ... a decree in such a suit operates to vest title di-
rectly in the complaining party.3
5
The current Missouri in rem statutes36 provide that in a judgment of spe-
cific performance, conveyance or release, the judgment itself shall operate as
a conveyance of the record title if the party required to convey should fail
to do so.
In Thomas v. Scott,3"' the plaintiff sued to establish a destroyed deed.
The action was brought under an in rem statute which provided that in an
action to prove a lost deed, the court should "determine" the interests of
the parties."' The court held that under such a statute the effect of the
judgment in the action would be binding on the parties in all subsequent
proceedings, judicial or otherwise, and that title was therefore affected."9
In order that title be determined, the party contending invalidity of the
tute a segment of title itself. See Tobin v. Insurance Agency Co., 80 F.2d 241 (8th Cir.
1935); BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 322 (4th ed. 1951).
In May v. Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Co., 138 Mo. 275, 282, 39 S.W. 782, 784
(1897), the court stated: "But a mortgage or deed of trust is a conveyance of land upon
condition." (Case later overruled for lack of "involvement" of the deed of trust, not be-
cause deed of trust was not "title.") Accord, Vandergrif v. Brock, 158 Mo. 681, 59 S.W.
979 (1900), trans'd from 73 Mo. App. 646 (1898), retrans'd, 89 Mo. App. 411 (1901).
135. Comment, 41 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 30, 35 (1930), citing Balz v. Nelson, 171
Mo. 682, 72 S.W. 527 (1903), trans'd from 86 Mo. App. 374 (1900).
136. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 511.280, .300 (1959).
137. 214 Mo. 430, 113 S.W. 1093 (1908) (en bane).
138. Mo. REV. STAT. § 527.190 (1959).
139. Thomas v. Scott, 214 Mo. 430, 113 S.W. 1093 (1908) (en bane):
[W]hat is the effect of such a proceeding? In a subsequent suit or action to try the
full title, is the judgment of the court finding its execution, delivery and loss, a
mere brutum fulmen, of no judicial force, and the parties to such proceeding in
no way estopped by it, but at liberty to retry the whole matter anew? Or was it not
the purpose to give all parties interested a day in court of competent jurisdiction on
this particular question of the execution and delivery of the particular deed and its
legal effect, and to make the finding of the court a finality as to the execution of
the deed and its loss between such parties? Id. at 435, 113 S.W. at 1095. (Court's
emphasis in part.)
Compare the ejectment cases (§ 5.070) which hold that title is not determined because
the parties are not bound on the title issue by the judgment rendered.
§ 5.104r
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muniment of title must seek this determination as affirmative relief. The
supreme court denied jurisdiction in Williams v. Mackey,14° a suit to fore-
close a trust deed. Plaintiff claimed that a previous foreclosure was invalid
because the prior deed of trust was void. Neither party sought affirmative
relief-cancellation of a muniment; defendant claimed invalidity of plain-
tiff's title only as a defense, and the plaintiff asserted invalidity of defen-
dant's deed of trust only as an aid to her action. Thus the judgment could
only grant or refuse the foreclosure sought by the plaintiff, which would not
involve title."1 '
5.110. ACTIONS CONCERNING WILLS AND HEIRSHIP
A will devising real estate is a conveyance of realty, much the same as a
deed." An action in which such a will is involved is properly appealed to
the supreme court. 4"
In Missouri, title to the land of the decedent vests in either the heirs or
the devisees at the moment of death."' In actions seeking to contest,'"
140. 331 Mo. 68, 52 S.W.2d 831 (1932), trans'd, 227 Mo. App. 1016, 61 S.W.2d
968 (1933).
141. See § 5.090, "Actions Relating to Foreclosure, Execution and Sale." The de-
fendant may involve title by an appropriate claim for title relief. In Green v. Wilks, 109
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1937), the plaintiff sought only to enjoin advertisement of a sheriff's
sale, but the court held title was involved by the defendant's cross-bill seeking cancel-
lation of warranty deeds to the plaintiff as fraudulent conveyances. Conrey v. Pratt, 248
Mo. 576, 154 S.W. 749 (1913) (defendant sought to cancel plaintiff's deed of trust as
fraudulent).
142. Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S.W.2d 1035 (1938), frans'd from 106
S.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1937): "[W]e can perceive no difference in reason and principle, so
far as concerns the question of title, in a suit to set aside a deed that conveys real estate
and a suit to set aside a will that devises real estate." Id. at 190, 114 S.W.2d at 1037.
143. Proffer v. Proffer, supra note 142. However, it must affirmatively appear from
the record that the will purports to devise real estate. Hanna v. Sheetz, 355 Mo. 1215,
200 S.W.2d 338, trans'd, 240 Mo. App. 385, 205 S.W.2d 955 (1947) (record failed to
show will devised realty); Klaus v. Zimmerman, 174 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943)
(will did not devise realty).
144. Jones v. Nichols, 280 Mo. 653, 216 S.W. 962 (1919): "It is true ... that title
to land does not pass by will until the will is probated .... But it is equally true that
title does pass upon the probating of the will, and relates back and takes effect as of the
time of the testator's death." Id. at 665, 216 S.W. at 965. The court did not state
where title was posited between death and probate. It would seem more reasonable to
say that title vested at death, and was declared by probate. In Stolle v. Stolle, 66 S.W.2d
912, 914 (Mo. 1934), the court stated, in connection with a non-jurisdictional issue, that
"a will takes effect and transfers title only at and because of the death of the testa-
tor." In Dickerson v. Dickerson, 211 Mo. 483, 110 S.W. 700, 704 (1908), it was
held that the will becomes effective from and after the death of the testator. See also
Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.260 (1959): "When a person dies, his real and personal property
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probate,"' establish"" or construe'" a will, title is affected: the judgment
sought determines title in the heir or devisee and finally binds the parties
on the title issue.' If title under the will is not also disputed, however, and
the controversy concerns, for example, the right to partition the real
estate,'" or the establishment of a legacy as a lien upon the land devised,'
title is not involved and jurisdiction belongs in the court of appeals. If the
will has provided that the land be sold, and construction of the will would
.. passes to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will, or, in absence of such dis-
position, to the persons who succeed to his estate as his heirs... ." (Emphasis added.)
In actions to probate, establish, contest or construe the will, or for declaratory
judgment, the judgment will simple declare to which of the parties the title passed at
death. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.087 (1959): "No will is effectual for the purpose of
proving title to ... any real or personal property, disposed of by the will, until it has
been admitted to probate." (Emphasis added.) Thus the effect of administration of a will
is not to vest title, but to prove it. Of course, probate of the will cannot effectively de-
clare title in one or the other party, if within the time allowed, the probate is success-
fully contested. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 473.083 (1959). Hence, if the implication, sometimes
appearing in will actions, that "title must be taken from one litigant and given to an-
other" were correct, jurisdiction on appeal would be in the court of appeals. But see
Ray v. Nethery, 255 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1953). It is suggested that this is an erroneous
interpretation of the rule that title must be determined in favor of one litigant and ad-
versely to another, which rule does not require title divestiture from one party. See §
5.042, notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
145. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 473.083 (1959). Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S.W.
1035 (1938), discussed supra note 142: "The devisee's sole claim is under the will and
an adjudication as to the will's validity [in this will contest] would seem a direct ad-
judication as to the title between heir and devisee." Id. at 190, 114 S.W. at 1037.
146. Smith v. Dardenne Presbyterian Church, 378 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1964) (appeal
from order of distribution of realty under will by probate court) ; Morton v. Simm, 263
S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1953).
147. Norwood v. Norwood, 353 Mo. 548, 183 S.W.2d 118 (1944).
148. Judgment in a suit to construe a will determines the parties' respective interests.
Taylor v. Hughes, 363 Mo. 392, 251 S.W.2d 94 (1952); Harwell v. Magill, 147 S.W.2d
684 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 348 Mo. 365, 153 S.W.2d 362 (1941) (suit in equity to
determine meaning of phrase in a will); see Burrer v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 92 S.W.2d
885 (1936), in which the supreme court expressly accepted jurisdiction of an action to
construe a will.
149. The entire proceeding of administration of the estate is in rem. Mo. REv. STAT. §
473.013 (1959). The probate judgment becomes final after nine months. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 473.077 (1959). A contest judgment is final unless a motion for new trial is
filed or an appeal taken. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 473.083 (1959).
150. In Johnson v. Woodard, 352 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1961), trans'd from 343 S.W.2d
646 (Ct. App. 1961), retrans'd, 356 S.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1962), the plaintiff contended
that the will devised a tenancy in common and sought partition. The defendants claimed
that a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship passed; therefore, defendants argued,
the testator's intention precluded partition. The court held that there was no dispute
concerning title, such that title could be determined adversely to one party and in favor
of another. The only issue was the right to partition.
151. Hourigan v. McBee, 119 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1938), trans'd, 130 S.W.2d 661
(Ct. App. 1939).
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be made only to determine interests in the proceeds, title is not affected-
thus not involved-because the judgment cannot determine title to be in
one of the parties."
The supreme court has jurisdiction of appeals from suits to establish
heirship. "Establishing by court decree that one person is the child or heir of
another is in effect establishing a deed of adoption... and that is a mui-
ment of title from a decedent in the absence of a will as effectual as is a will
one dying testate or of a grant inter vivos.' 1
Proceedings by the guardian of a widow seeking the court's direction
whether the will should be renounced do not involve title to real estate. The
interests of the parties may be disputed and the decision may eventually
cause title to be held by one party rather than another, but the judgment
itself does not affect these interests. The title will not be finally determined
until the option to elect is exercised." 4
5.120. ACTIONS CONCERNING EASEMENTS
5.121. Easements in General
An easement is an "interest... carved out" of the principal owner's fee
simple; the land in which it exists constitutes a servient tenement."' 5 Thus,
judgments which finally adjudicate the disputed existence of an easement
in suits to set aside or establish are appealable to the supreme court."'
152. Matthews v. Hughes, 232 S.W. 99 (Mo. 1921), transd, 237 S.W. 808 (Ct. App.
1922). The court held the will worked an equitable conversion of land, and the will
was treated as disposing of personal property only.
153. McCary v. McCary, 217 S.W. 547, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920), trans'd, 239 S.W.
848 (Mo. 1922); accord, Love v. White, 150 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 348
Mo. 640, 154 S.W.2d 759 (1941) (action to establish pretermitted heirship); see Hogane
v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1954) (action seeking decree of equitable adoption).
154. First Nat'l Bank v. Schaake, 355 Mo. 1196, 200 S.W.2d 326, trans'd, 240 Mo.
App. 217, 203 S.W.2d 611 (1947); In re Ellis' Estate, 110 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. Ct. App.
1937), trans'd, 127 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1939).
155. Pendleton v. Gundaker, 370 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), trans'd,
381 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. 1964). The factor of actual subtraction from the fee simple dis-
tinguishes easements from such interests as liens which only "incumber" or "entangle"
the fee title. An easement is an "interest" in the land. Missouri State Oil Co. v. Fuse, 360
Mo. 1022, 232 S.W.2d 501 (1950); Baker v. Squire, 143 Mo. 92, 44 S.W. 792 (1898);
Dalton v. Johnson, 319 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958), trans'd, 320 S.W.2d 569 (Mo.
1959); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 450 (1944); GILL, MIssouRI TITLES 55 (1931).
But see Smith v. Santarelli, 355 Mo. 1047, 199 S.W.2d 411 (1947), trans'd, 207
S.W.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1948) (action to enjoin violation of easement, not to adjudicate
title): "[An easement, strictly speaking, does not carry any title to the land over which
it is exercised; it is rather a right to use the land for particular purposes." Id. at 1049,
199 S.W.2d at 412.
156. Rosenbloom v. Grossman, 351 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1961); Peters v. Platte Pipe
Line Co., 305 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957) (dismissal of petition to set aside easements be-
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A more difficult problem exists in cases in which the principal ownership
cannot be further affected because the existence of the easement is admitted
and the controversy concerns only the adverse interests of the litigants in
the easement. The supreme court has held that it has jurisdiction of cases
disputing ownership of a concededly existent easement."' The court also
exercised jurisdiction of a case in which the existence of some sort of ease-
ment was apparently conceded, and the parties contested only the extent
and nature of the easement. In White v. Bevier Coal Co.,5' the grantees
of the fee title of a certain tract of land brought suit to determine the title,
rights and interests in that tract as between themselves and the defendants.
Defendants held an easement under the deed executed by the grantor of the
deed to the plaintiff grantees. Plaintiff conceded that the defendants could
transport coal taken from the mines on the tract concerned, but contended
cause of fraud in procurement); Robb v. N. W. Elec. Power Coop., 297 S.W.2d 385
(Mo. 1957) (judgment refusing to set aside instrument conveying easement); Mills v.
Taylor, 270 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1954); Jacobs v. Brewster, 354 Mo. 729, 190 S.W.2d
894 (1954) (reciprocal easements in driveway declared); Larkin v. Kieselmann, 259
S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953) (defendants appealed denial of claim for affirmative relief to
establish easement); Missouri State Oil Co. v. Fuse, supra note 155 (denial of claim for
establishment of easement); Chapman v. Schearf, 229 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1950) (en
banc), trans'd from 220 S.W.2d 757 (Ct. App. 1949); Davis v. Lea, 293 Mo. 660, 239
S.W. 823 (1922) (judgment established easement even though only injunction prayed);
Pendleton v. Gundaker, supra note 155 (denial of count for declaration that driveway
was easement); Mueller v. Larison, 347 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), trans'd;
Dalton v. Johnson, supra note 155 (appeal from judgment denying easement for passage
of livestock). Actions to establish or set aside meet the "effect" requirement of supreme
court jurisdiction because a decree establishing an easement would "interfere with the
absolute owners', defendants', right of exclusive and unrestricted possession and user,
and which decree would amount to an adjudication of such interest in defendants' real
estate as would encumber the land and cloud the clarity of defendants' otherwise per-
fect fee simple title." Missouri State Oil Co. v. Fuse, supra at 503. A potential difficulty
is raised by the use of "encumbrance" language in this case and others (e.g., Smith v.
Santarelli, 355 Mo. 1047, 199 S.W.2d 411 (1947), discussed supra note 155). Such
language is unnecessary in view of the fact that an easement constitutes an "interest" in
real estate.
157. Ginter v. City of Webster Groves, 349 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. 1961), trans'd from
338 S.W.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1960) (appeal from judgment declaring title to a street
easement in city adverse to plaintiff); Billings v. Paine, 319 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1959)
(suit to try title to cemetery lot); see Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Riss, 312
S.W.2d 846 (Mo.), trans'd, 319 S.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1958). In a case of this kind in
which the existence of the easement is admitted, the dispute focuses only upon the frac-
tional interest and not the reversioner principal landowner's fee. Since the courts hold
that the minor quantum of the fee simple-an easement-is a sufficient real estate "inter-
est," when its existence is admitted the action becomes a suit to determine title. See
§ 5.160. If there is no controversy involving title to the easement but only as to its
location, jurisdiction is in the court of appeals. Allen v. Smith, 375 S.W.2d 874 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1964).
158. 261 S.W.2d 81 (Mo.), trans'd from 254 S.W.2d 42 (Ct. App. 1953).
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that the reservation in the deed did not grant them freedom to transport
coal across that tract taken from mines surrounding the tract. If the su-
preme court had viewed the interest actually disputed by the parties as the
right to transport coal from adjoining lands across the tract, jurisdiction
would have been in the court of appeals."5 9 But since "the question of
whether the Coal Company owns an easement over the plaintiffs' land is
directly in issue," the supreme court accepted appellate jurisdiction. 0
The principal problem in actions to enjoin obstruction of an easement
relates to the requirement that title be directly affected and not merely col-
laterally examined. Despite some confusion in the earlier cases based upon
the belief that the judgment of the equity court in granting the injunction
would establish the easement,1"' the courts now hold that actions to enjoin
obstruction of an easement are not properly appealed to the supreme
court. 2 The judgment granting injunctive relief is viewed as operating
159. Compare Fischer v. Johnson, 139 Mo. 433, 41 S.W. 203 (1897), discussed
supra note 20, in which the court held, in effect, that the right to reap crops from lands
(the title to which was conceded) did not constitute an interest in real estate.
If the contested right were viewed as similar to a leasehold interest, the jurisdictional
result in Bevier would be subject to question. Section 5.030.
160. White v. Bevier Coal Co., 261 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo. 1953). A reading of the
facts, however, indicates that both parties conceded that the Coal Company had an ease-
ment.
161. In Peters v. Worth, 164 Mo. 431, 64 S.W. 490 (1901), a suit to restrain ob-
struction of a stairway, the issue involved was whether the deed to the plaintiff passed
an easement for use of the stairway. The supreme court accepted jurisdiction of defen-
dant's appeal from a judgment for complainant, stating that "it is apparent on the face
of the bill that the easement claimed is a right in the land ... and the trial of the claim
involved the title to real estate." Id. at 437, 64 S.W. at 491. The court cited the case
of Baker v. Squire, 143 Mo. 92, 44 S.W. 792 (1898), which had reached the supreme
court on a writ of certiorari after an unsuccessful attempt to transfer from the court of
appeals. The supreme court had jurisdiction in Summers v. Cordell, 171 Mo. App. 184,
156 S.W. 486 (1913), trans'd, 187 S.W. 5 (Mo. 1916), an action to enjoin the opening
of a new public road, because "the order of the county court [ordering the road] ...
if permitted to stand, would charge appellants' real estate with an easement .. . and
the order would divest that much of the title and interest in and to said land out of ap-
pellants and invest the same in [respondent]." Id. at 186, 156 S.W. at 486-87; see JoNns,
EASEMENTS § 889 (1898). See also Comment, 41 U. Mo. BULL. L. SFR. 30 (1930). One
early case, however, reasoned that the investigation of the easement was made only for
the purpose of granting or denying the injunctive relief sought, and transferred the ap-
peal. Porter v. Kansas City & No. Connecting Ry., 175 Mo. 96, 74 S.W. 992, trans'd
from court of appeals, retrans'd, 103 Mo. App. 422, 77 S.W. 582 (1903). Although the
court used language which would normally indicate only incidental or collateral involve-
ment (see § 5.150, "Suits Seeking Injunctive Relief"), it cannot be stated unequivocally
that this was the reason for its determination of lack of involvement. The court ap-
peared to give weight to the fact that defendant had conceded the plaintiff's easement;
if so, the holding possibly turned on the lack of dispute of title, rather than lack of effect.
162. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Riss, 312 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1958), discussed
supra note 157; Judge v. Durham, 274 S.W.2d 247 (Mo. 1955), trans'd from 265 S.W.2d
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in personam only, not running with the land, and the inquiry "into the
validity of plaintiff's claim of an easement over defendants' land in order to
determine whether to grant or withhold the relief prayed [is] ... purely inci-
dental or collateral."' 3  Although an arguably inconsistent result was
reached in Albrecht v. Highway Comm'n in 1963,' the rule appears to be
that for the supreme court to have jurisdiction, an affirmative adjudication
of the existence of the easement must be sought in addition to injunctive
relief.'
437 (Ct. App. 1954), retrans'd, 281 S.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1955); Gibson v. Sharp, 364
Mo. 1007, 270 S.W.2d 721 (1954), trans'd, 277 S.W.2d 672 (Ct. App. 1955); Smith v.
Santarelli, 355 Mo. 1047, 199 S.W.2d 411 (1947), discussed supra note 156; Drainage
Dist. No. 28 v. Drainage Dist. No. 23, 144 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.), trans'd, 146 S.W.2d 858
(Ct. App. 1940); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Silver King Oil & Gas Co., 117 S.W.2d
225 (Mo. 1938), trans'd, 234 Mo. App. 589, 127 S.W.2d 31 (1939); Oliver v. Wilhite,
329 Mo. 524, 45 S.W.2d 1083 (1932), trans'd from 41 S.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1931),
retrans'd, 227 Mo. App. 538, 55 S.W.2d 491 (1932); Wallach v. Stetina, 20 S.W.2d 663
(Mo. 1929), trans'd, 28 S.W.2d 389 (Ct. App. 1930). Gibson v. Sharp, supra, overruled
two cases which had exercised jurisdiction of appeals from injunction actions because
an easement was at issue. Zinser v. Lucks, 361 Mo. 671, 235 S.W.2d 844 (1951)
(defendant's answer prayed injunction because of easement by prescription); Dillen v.
Edwards, 263 S.W.2d 433 (Mo.), trans'd from 254 S.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1953)
(defendants' appeal from granting of plaintiff's injunction).
163. Oliver v. Wilhite, supra note 162, at 527, 45 S.W.2d at 1084. This holding is
analogous to those denying jurisdiction in actions to enjoin trespass (§ 5.150).
164. 363 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1962). The court stated that it took jurisdiction because
the case involved "construction of the constitution" and "involved title to real estate,"
saying nothing more and citing no cases. The plaintiffs claimed to own negative ease-
ments in certain land which had been acquired by the defendant commission, and sought
to enjoin construction of a highway thereon, under the theory that the negative easements
constituted property rights for which they were entitled to compensation.
165. Billings v. Paine, 319 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1959) (suit to try and determine title
to a cemetery lot); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Riss, 312 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1958),
discussed supra note 161 (dictum); Missouri State Oil Co. v. Fuse, 360 Mo. 1022, 232
S.W.2d 501 (1950) (dictum); Pendleton v. Gundaker, 370 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. Ct. App.
1963), discussed supra note 155. See Winslow v. Sauerwein, 365 Mo. 269, 282 S.W.2d
14 (1955), trans'd from 272 S.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1954), retrans'd, 285 S.W.2d 21
(Ct. App. 1955), in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant's alleged trespass on
a claimed private street. The defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that the street
had been dedicated to public use. Upon a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' bill and
the defendants' affirmative counterclaim, only the plaintiff appealed the overruling of
his motion for a new trial. The supreme court noted that the defendants had not
appealed, and that the "defendants' counterclaim must be disregarded" in the jurisdic-
tional determination, because by defendants' failure to appeal or seek a new trial, the
issues of the counterclaim were not "properly presented and preserved for review." The
court then held that the plaintiffs' appeal sought only injunctive relief, and thus did not
involve the title to real estate. It would seem by implication, therefore, that had the
defendants' affirmative counterclaim been presented for review, title would not have
been only incidentally involved, but would have been involved for jurisdictional purposes.
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5.122. Restrictive Covenants
It is questionable whether a restrictive covenant on land amounts to an
easement, and thus is an interest in real estate for purposes of supreme court
jurisdiction. It has been held that a combination of certain covenants, re-
strictions, stipulations and privileges concerning use of land and adjoining
lakes constitutes an easement or easements, and that the appeal from a judg-
ment terminating them lies in the supreme court.16 The court, however, did
not separate them and discuss each as constituting an easement. In Tooth-
aker v. Pleasant,"'7 the court held that covenants restricting sale, running
with the land, so "complicated and entangled" the principal owners title
that title to real estate was involved. In Wuertenbaecher v. Feik,1"' how-
ever, the court held that an action to enjoin violation of building restrictive
covenants did not involve title, distinguishing Toothaker on the basis that
the defendant in that case was enjoined "from selling, occupying, renting,
leasing... to or by negroes or persons of African descent."'6 9 Toothaker
was thus distinguished on the basis of the different types of covenants."
Because they were injunction actions, these two cases would now be
heard by the court of appeals even if the restrictions concerned were ease-
ments. Presumably, however, in suits for affirmative adjudication of restric-
tive covenants, whether they constitute easements would be the pivotal
jurisdictional question. No definitive answer is provided by the cases.
166. Wilson v. Owen, 261 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1953) (declaratory judgment action);
see Comment, 41 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 30, 37 (1930), and cases cited therein for a
discussion of restrictive covenants as equitable easements.
167. 315 Mo. 1239, 288 S.W. 38 (1926).
168. 36 S.W.2d 913 (Mo.), trans'd, 43 S.W.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1931).
169. _d. at 914.
170. For the purpose of discussion of different types of interests as possibly constituting
easements (or failing to do so), Wuertenbaecher and Toothaker have been referred to
as implying that a restriction on sale is an easement while a restriction on building rights
is not. It is probable, however, that the primary object of the court in Wuertenbaecher
was to follow the general rule that cases seeking injunctive relief do not properly involve
title (§ 5.150). However, in order to do this the court was forced to either overrule
Toothaker, or to distinguish it, since both were actions seeking to enjoin violations of
restrictive covenants. In deciding to distinguish Toothaker, the court was forced to
make the distinction upon the only basis available: the variant types of restrictions
concerned. The court probably then, in its desire to follow other injunction cases, made a
distinction without substantive difference between the building restriction in Wuerten-
baecher and the sale restriction in Toothaker.
This conclusion that there was no intention to create a substantive distinction between
building and sale restrictions is supported by dicta found in two cases in the courts of
appeals to the effect that restrictions on building rights do constitute equitable easements.
(The courts of appeals retained jurisdiction because the "involvement" requirement was
not met.) Wearen v. Woodson, 268 S.W. 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); State ex rel. Shiek
v. McElhinney, 190 Mo. App. 618, 176 S.W. 292 (1915).
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5.130. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
The entire fee of the landowner may be condemned for public pur-
poses,"' but the condemnor usually is vested with only an easement.' An
easement constitutes title to real estate for appellate jurisdictional pur-
poses,"' so that if the easement is procedurally involved in the condemna-
tion proceedings, jurisdiction belongs in the supreme court.
The courts have only limited functions in the proceedings by which title
to land is appropriated. The "necessity" for the taking of land is left to the
determination of the condemnor; it is termed a "political" or "legislative"
question into which the courts will not inquire. The right of the condemnor
to appropriate land to its use depends upon the statute by which the power
of eminent domain, inherent in the sovereignty of the state, has been dele-
gated to the condemnor. This right does not rest upon any judgment of
the court.Y'7 Rathcr, when the condemnor pays the proper amount into
court the titie passes by operation of law, independently of the court's judg-
ment.'"5
The condemnation judgment which exposes the title to appropriation by
the condemnor is similar to a foreclosure judgment which orders the land
sold. In the foreclosure action title is not involved because not directly af-
fected by the judgment without the aid of subsequent proceedings." De-
spite this reasoning, the supreme court until 1949 accepted jurisdiction in
condemnation appeals. The courts did not speak of the effect of the judg-
ment as such, but of the divestiture of title by the condemnation proceeding
171. State ex rel. Scott v. Trimble, 308 Mo. 123, 272 S.W. 66 (1925).
172. MCDRMOTT, LAND TITLES AND LAND LAWS § 25.26 (1954); NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 150 (1917).
173. See § 5.120.
174. State ex. rel. Lane v. Pankey, 359 Mo. 118, 221 S.W.2d 195 (1949) (en banc);
City of Kirkwood v. Venable, 351 Mo. 460, 173 S.W.2d 8 (1943); St. Louis Housing
Authority v. Jower, 267 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); State ex rel. Highway
Comm'n v. Schultz, 241 Mo. App. 570, 243 S.W.2d 808 (1951).
175. State ex rtel. Highway Comm'n v. Day, 327 Mo. 122, 35 S.W.2d 37 (1930),
(en banc), trans'd, 226 Mo. App. 884, 47 S.W.2d 147 (1932) (dictum):
The judgment itself is silent as to title, and we think properly so. The exercise of
the power of eminent domain has been delegated by the Legislature to the state
highway commission and to various municipal and public service corporations,
but not to the courts .... When it [the condemnor] pays to the owner of the
property so appropriated just compensation, the title passes by operation of law.
The only function that the court performs in a condemnation proceeding is in the
ascertainment of just compensation, unless the question of public use be drawn into
the proceeding. It may in its judgment make pronouncement of condemnation,
but, if so, its judgment in that respect is a mere empty form. Id. at 125, 35 S.W.2d
at 38. (Emphasis added.)
Accord, State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Oakley, 354 Mo. 124, 188 S.W.2d 820 (1945)
(en banc). See also State ex rel. Stratton v. Maughmer, 240 Mo. App. 714, 214 S.W.2d
754 (1948).
176. See § 5.090.
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as a whole, holding title involved because the condemnation proceeding
affected title.1" Furthermore, in the condemnation cases prior to 1949, the
courts did not discuss the dispute requirement. Generally the title of the
landowner is conceded, and the condemnor claims no interest in the land
prior to the institution of the condemnation proceeding.
In 1949, the supreme court en banc overruled the decisions holding that
the supreme court had jurisdiction when the right to condemn or the valid-
ity of the condemnation proceeding was assailed. In City of St. Louis v.
Butler Co.,"' the court denied jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment of
dismissal of a petition for condemnation. The court reasoned, perhaps
loosely, that the title may be affected by a condemnation suit, but that it
was not involved because it was not also disputed by the parties. The deci-
sion turned on the fact that the condemnor initially conceded the title in
the landowner, and then sought to take all or part of it. It analogized the
condemnation action to the enforcement of a lien, in which the plaintiff
concedes the title of the defendant and seeks to encumber and foreclose it.
The decision in Butler has been consistently followed. 79
The reasoning and result of Butler primarily touch actions brought by
177. See City of Kirkwood v. Venable, 351 Mo. 460, 173 S.W.2d 8 (1943),
accepting jurisdiction because the issue concerned the authority of the city to condemn
and the power of the court by condemnation "proceedings" to divest title. City of St.
Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (en bane), trans'd, 223 S.W.2d 831
(Ct. App. 1949), although holding title not involved in a condemnation suit because
title was not in dispute, characterized title as being affected by the whole of the con-
demnation proceedings.
Even prior to 1949 not all condemnation appeals were properly brought to the supreme
court. The supreme court had jurisdiction if the appellant attacked the legality or
authority of the condemnation proceedings. City of Kirkwood v. Venable, supra;
Thomas v. Craghead, 332 Mo. 211, 58 S.W.2d 281 (1933). The same result obtained
if the right of plaintiff to condemn was assailed. Consolidated School Dist. v. O'Malley,
343 Mo. 1187, 125 S.W.2d 818, trans'd from 232 Mo. App. 1116, 115 S.W.2d 171
(1938); State ex rel. Highway Comnm'n v. Gordon, 327 Mo. 160, 36 S.W.2d 105 (1931)
(en bane). If the appeal involved only a challenge to the amount of the award, it was
properly taken to the court of appeals. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Day, 327 Mo.
122, 35 S.W.2d 37 (1930) (en bane), discussed supra note 175; Missouri Power &
Light Co. v. Creed, 325 Mo. 1194, 30 S.W.2d 605 (en bane), trans'd, 32 S.W.2d 783
(Ct. App. 1930). The reasoning for the result when cases involve only the amount of
the award seems to be that the judgment on appeal does not alter the fact of con-
demnation, but changes only the assessment.
178. 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (en banc), trans'd, 223 S.W.2d 831 (Ct. App.
1949).
179. E.g., State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Barbeau, 330 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1960);
State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Hudspeth, 297 S.W.2d 510 (Mo.), trans'd, 303 S.W.2d
703 (Ct. App. 1957); In re Off-Street Parking Facilities, 287 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1956);
Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Brandstetter, 363 Mo. 904, 254 S.W.2d 636 (1953), trans'd,
241 Mo. App. 1138, 263 S.W.2d 880 (1954).
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corporate bodies but apparently apply similarly to actions brought by
private citizens seeking to create private or public roads. Before 1949 the
cases held that jurisdiction of road cases belonged in the supreme court.'
But in Butler these actions were treated as condemnation cases and specifi-
cally overruled."' The cases overruled were actions brought pursuant to
statutes... seeking to create the interest necessary for the roads; the interests
held by the parties were not disputed at the time of institution of the actions.
Butler, however, does not apply to actions seeking to declare that the inter-
ests necessary for roads existed before the time action is brought. Such in-
terests are created by certain operative facts resulting in ownership by pre-
scription or estoppel in pais.' 3 These cases present the requisite dispute of
title to an interest in real estate at the time of institution of the action and
are properly appealed to the supreme court.'
The rule in Butler is restricted by its language to appeals that seek only
the court's adjudication of the validity of the proceedings in the lower court,
the right of the condemnor to appropriate, or the amount of compensation
awarded.' But the injection of a question of public use, as distinguished
from the necessity of the taking by the condemnor, calls for a judicial deter-
mination and imposes on the courts the additional duty of preventing
the taking of private property for a private or non-public use.'86 Although
the question of public use has not arisen as often as it did before 1945 (when
180. Private roads: Welch v. Shipman, 357 Mo. 838, 210 S.W.2d 1008 (1948);
State ex rel. Palmer v. Elliff, 332 Mo. 229, 58 S.W.2d 283 (1933), trans'd from 43
S.W.2d 1059 (Ct. App. 1931); Richter v. Rodgers, 327 Mo. 543, 550, 37 S.W.2d 523,
526 (1931). Public roads: Mitchell v. Nichols, 330 Mo. 1233, 52 S.W.2d 885 (1932),
trans'd from 20 S.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1929); Reeves v. Green, 282 Mo. 521, 222 S.W.
795 (1920), trans'd from 185 S.W. 218 (Ct. App. 1916); In re Critzer, 189 Mo. App.
61, 175 S.W. 104 (1915), trans'd, 275 Mo. 514, 205 S.W. 16 (1918).
181. City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 1224, 219 S.W.2d 372, 374 n.3
(1949) (en bane).
182. The current statutes are: private roads-Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 228.340-.480
(1959); public roads-Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 228.010-.190 (1959).
183. For a discussion of prescription and estoppel in pals see Borders v. Glenn, 232
S.W. 1062, 1064 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921), trans'd from 226 S.W. 915 (Mo. 1920).
184. Warm v. Gruner, 251 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1952) (plaintiffs, pursuant to Mo.
Rzv. STAT. § 228.190 (1959), sought declaration of public road on defendant's land
on basis of seventy-five years prior use by public); Chapman v. Schearf, 360 Mo. 551,
229 S.W.2d 552 (1950) (en banc), trans'd from 220 S.W.2d 757 (Ct. App. 1949)
(seeking to establish that title to easement had passed to public at the time of prior
dedication of land). See generally § 5.120, "Actions Concerning Easements."
185. As to appeals in which only the compensation is attacked, Butler only served
to affirm prior cases holding jurisdiction was properly in the courts of appeals. See
note 177 supra.
186. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Schultz, 241 Mo. App. 570, 243 S.W.2d 808
(1951).
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new constitutional provisions expanded the scope of eminent domain 8 7 ),
a number of decisions have cryptically implied that the existence of a ques-
tion of "public use" would confer jurisdiction on the supreme court. 88
These unqualified implications do not advert to the fact that even if the
trial court passes on the question of the public nature of the proposed use,
its judgment will not necessarily affect title." 9 If title has not yet passed to
the condemnor, the judgment of the trial or appellate court can have no di-
rect effect on title, whether it is in favor of the condemnor or the condem-
nee. The court can only arrest the whole condemnation proceeding or sanc-
tion its continuation. If, on the other hand, the title has been appropriated
by the condemnor prior to the court's determination of the public use ques-
tion, and the judgment has the effect of divesting that title from the con-
demnor, then it could be said that the effect requirement is met.' The
187. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 27 for practical purposes precludes the raising of the public
use issue with regard to excess condemnation; Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 21 relieves cities
and counties engaged in redevelopment projects of many public use challenges. See also
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 29 regarding public use and highway access.
188. In State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Schade, 265 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Mo.),
trans'd, 271 S.W.2d 196 (1954), it is stated: "Appellant does not question that the
land is being taken for public use, therefore, title to real estate is not involved." Accord,
Kansas City v. National Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 265 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. 1954), trans'd;
City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 1224, 219 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1949) (en
banc), discussed in text accompanying note 178 supra.
189. The implications stem from a statement in State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Day,
327 Mo. 122, 35 S.W.2d 37 (1930) (en banc), discussed supra note 175. In Day the
supreme court held that the divestiture of title is within the power of the condemnor,
not the courts; then, in a statement not necessary to the decision, or even to the point it
was attempting to establish, the court said: "The only function that the court performs
in a condemnation proceeding is the ascertainment of just compensation, unless the
question of public use be drawn into the proceeding." Id. at 125, 35 S.W.2d at 38.
(Emphasis added.)
In City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (1949) (en banc),
discussed supra note 178, the supreme court gave birth to the doctrine conceived in Day.
In Butler, the court interpreted Day as stating that a condemnation suit "does not involve
the title to real estate except incidentally, unless the question of public use be drawn
into the proceeding." Id. at 1224, 219 S.W.2d at 374. The Day case, however, did not
hold that an issue of public use would directly involve title to real estate, but said only
that such an issue would give the court another duty, i.e., to decide whether the proposed
use is public, while the power to affect title yet remained only in the condemnor. This
public use "doctrine" of the Butler case was reinforced in State ex rel. Highway Comm'n
v. Schade, supra note 188, at 384, in which the supreme court said "appellant does not
question that the land is being taken for public use, therefore, title to real estate is not
involved." (Emphasis added.) The statement was quoted and followed in a companion
case, Kansas City v. National Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 265 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1954), trans'd
(action by city to condemn property for expressway).
190. This possibility is apparently ignored by the court. Even this possibility is
precluded, however, if such a judgment would only order the condemnor to divest itself
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implications in the cases, however, are not conditioned upon the time at
which title has passed and thus the cases give an unsatisfactory explanation
of why title is involved if a question of public use is raised.
Whether a question of public use gives the court power to affect the title
bears only on the effect requirement. There remains the express basis of the
Butler decision denying supreme court jurisdiction: there is no dispute about
which party has title at the moment the proceedings are begun. Even if a
public use question exists, title is conceded to be in one party or the other at
the time the action is commenced. 9'
5.140. Surrs SEEKING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF LAND CONTRACTS
Two principal conditions must exist before it may be said that there is
involvement of title: 92 (1) the judgment sought must, if rendered, directly
determine a title issue, and (2) there must be a dispute between the parties
about which has title at the moment suit is filed. The first requirement is
satisfied in actions for specific performance of contracts for the sale of land
because the judgment sought would directly effect a passage of title. Further,
by statute, a decree of specific performance serves as a deed when re-
corded. 9
Satisfaction of the second requirement, however, is doubtful in spe-
cific performance cases. Legal title is conceded to be in the vendor at the
of title, since the judgment itself would not then directly operate on the title.
See State ex rel. Stratton v. Maughmer, 240 Mo. App. 714, 214 S.W.2d 754 (1948),
which suggests that title may pass to the condemnor who may enter the land and proceed
with construction even while issues raised by the owner are being litigated. In an
analogous situation, however, the supreme court held title was involved in an appeal
from an order overruling the landowner's motion to vacate the judgment granting con-
demnation after the condemnor had already taken title: "whatever title respondents have
to the property sought to be condemned is derived from the condemnation proceedings."
Caruthersville School Dist. v. Latshaw, 360 Mo. 1211, 1213, 233 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1950).
The court's additional statement that the divestment of title was effected by the judgment
rather than the acts of the condemnor conflicts with the statement in State ex rel. High-
way Comm'n v. Day, 327 Mo. 122, 35 S.W.2d 37 (1931), discussed supra note 175.
191. It is possible that the courts, in implying the existence of supreme court juris-
diction when a public use question exists, mean to imply that a constitutional question
arises automatically with such an issue. But that is not true. The Butler case indicates
that the existence of a "public use" issue does not give supreme court jurisdiction per se.
City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (1949) (en banc),
discussed in text accompanying note 178 supra. In Butler, a question of public use was
the primary basis for appeal, but the supreme court held the trial court could have
ruled on the issue without a construction of the constitution. See § 1.022(c).
192. E.g., City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (1949)
(en banc), discussed text accompanying note 178 supra; notes 27-32, 42 supra.
193. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 511.280, .320 (1959). The in rem statutes are discussed
in J 5.104.
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time suit is filed."" Nevertheless, supreme court jurisdiction has been uni-
formly sustained without any discussion of the dispute requirement.""5 The
result might be justified by use of the doctrine of equitable conversion-
equitable title is held by the vendee as soon as the contract is executed-but
no cases were found that rested jurisdiction upon this doctrine.
5.150. SUITS SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As a general rule, appeal from an action seeking only injunctive relief
does not involve title to real estate, 96 even though the sole issue litigated
194. E.g., Barnes v. Stone, 198 Mo. 471, 95 S.W. 915 (1906); Miller v. St. Louis &
K.C. Ry., 162 Mo. 424, 63 S.W. 85 (1901).
195. Rice v. Griffith, 349 Mo. 373, 161 S.W.2d 220 (1942), trans'd from 144 S.W.2d
837 (Ct. App. 1940); Barnes v. Stone, 198 Mo. 471, 95 S.W. 915 (1906); Miller v.
St. Louis & K.C. Ry., 162 Mo. 424, 63 S.W. 85 (1901); Tant v. Gee, 236 Mo. App.
133, 146 S.W.2d 61 (1940), trans'd, 348 Mo. 633, 154 S.W.2d 745 (1941); Hawkins v.
Hyde, 219 S.W. 974 (Mo. Ct. App.), transd, 238 S.W. 1082 (Mo. 1920). Other cases
holding title involved in suits for specific performance of a contract to sell but not
discussing the effect upon or dispute of title: Rookstool v. Neaf, 377 S.W.2d 402 (Mo.
1964); Price v. Ridler, 373 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1963); State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v.
Hammel, 372 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1963); Cossairt v. Reich, 370 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1963);
Kerrick v. Schoenberg, 328 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1959); Barr v. Snyder, 294 S.W.2d 4
(Mo. 1956); Kauffin v. Turek, 277 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1955); Farrow v. Farrow, 277
S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1955); Drake v. Hicks, 249 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. 1952); McCrory v.
Brinckman, 379 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), trans'd to supreme court; Herzog v.
Ross, 192 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 196 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1946) (en bane).
Although divestiture is not discussed, the supreme court has held title involved when an
option to purchase is sought to be enforced. Kalivas v. Hauck, 365 Mo. 923, 290 S.W.2d
94 (1956); Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956). Title was held
involved when the judgment did not grant specific performance, but gave the vendor the
option to deliver a deed, subject to certain penalties if he failed to do so. State ex rel.
Place v. Bland, 353 Mo. 639, 183 S.W.2d 878 (en bane), trans'd from 180 S.W.2d 538
(Ct. App. 1944). The supreme court here felt that because the "alternative [to the
transfer of title by the defendant] was (as it might be) so onerous as to be coercive, in
practical effect it [the decree] amounted to enforcing performance." Id. at 647, 183
S.W.2d at 884. This decision indicates a rare judicial willingness to subordinate form
to substance. Technically, the "effect" requirement was probably not met because of
the contingency of the final effect of the judgment on title.
When a request for specific performance is premature because the time for execution
of a deed has not arisen, it has been held that title cannot be involved since the judg-
ment could not affect the title without subsequent proceedings. Atkinson v. Smothers,
291 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). It is arguable, however, that in making this
jurisdictional decision the court must make at least a partial determination of the merits
of the petition, contrary to the refusal to anticipate the consideration of the merits in
Fisher v. Lavelock, 282 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1955), transd, 290 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App.
1956).
196. E.g., State ex rel. Northside Church of God v. Church of God, 243 S.W.2d 308
(Mo. 1951), trans'd, 247 S.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1952); Mueller v. Klinhart, 164
S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1942), trans'd, 167 S.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1943); Mexico Refractories
Co. v. Roberts, 161 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.), trans'd, 237 Mo. App. 299, 167 S.W.2d 660
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may be one of title. Any title investigation is made by the court for the sole
purpose of reaching a decision whether to grant the injunction;... the in-
junction operates only in personam and not upon the title.'98 Thus, when
the defendant claims the title in an action to enjoin trespass, jurisdiction on
appeal is in the court of appeals, even though the trial court must decide
who has title to render a judgement.'99
Appeals from suits to enjoin the opening of roads established by the
county court were held to involve title to real estate until the case of Dillard
v. Sanderson °. in 1920. There the title was held only incidentally and
collaterally involved since the title interest taken for the road was established
by the administrative order of the county court and could not be affected
by the injunction action. Similarly, a suit to enjoin obstruction of public
and private roads do not involve title; the judgment therein cannot es-
tablish or destroy the establishment of the title or interest necessary for the
roadway.20 '
(1942); Mulik v. Jorganian, 326 Mo. 106, 30 S.W.2d 998 (1930), trans'd, 37 S.W.2d
963 (Ct. App. 1931); Nettleton Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W.2d
771 (en banc), trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928).
197. State ex rel. Northside Church of God v. Church of God, supra note 196; Hall v.
Gernhardt, 171 S.W.2d 669 (Mo.), trans'd, 174 S.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1943), dis-
cussed infra note 201; Mexico Refractories Co. v. Roberts, supra note 196; Nettleton
Bank v. Estate of McGauhey, supra note 196. See Mexico Refractories Co. v. Pignet's
Estate, 161 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. 1942), holding injunction will not lie as an original
and independent action to try title, and that title is only collaterally involved in injunc-
tion actions.
198. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Silver King Oil & Gas Co., 117 S.W.2d 225
(Mo. 1938), trans'd, 234 Mo. App. 589, 127 S.W.2d 31 (1939); Oliver v. Wilhite, 329
Mo. 524, 45 S.W.2d 1083 (1932), trans'd from 41 S.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1931),
retrans'd, 55 S.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1932); Boland v. Byrne, 145 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1940).
199. Sikes v. Turner, 242 S.W. 940 (Mo. 1922), trans'd, 212 Mo. App. 419, 247 S.W.
803 (1923); Marshall v. Reddick, 177 S.W. 381 (Mo. 1915).
200. 282 Mo. 436, 222 S.W. 766 (1920) (en bane), trans'd, 206 Mo. App. 217, 227
S.W. 658 (1921), overruling Ripkey v. Gresham, 279 Mo. 521, 214 S.W. 851 (1919) and
cases cited therein upholding supreme court jurisdiction.
201. Hall v. Gernhardt, 171 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. 1943), trans'd, 174 S.W.2d 915
(Ct. App. 1943); State ex rel. Pulley v. Thompson, 306 Mo. 239, 267 S.W. 605 (1924),
trans'd from 211 Mo. App. 434, 244 S.W. 940 (1922), retrans'd, 277 S.W. 56 (Ct. App.
1925); Brader v. City of Carthage, 250 S.W. 43 (Mo.), trans'd, 256 S.W. 548
(Ct. App. 1923). The Hall case, supra, was purportedly overruled by the supreme court
because it allegedly was a condemnation action holding title involved. City of St. Louis
v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (en bane), trans'd, 223 S.W.2d 831 (Ct.
App. 1949). However, since the Hall case was actually an injunction action, and the
court had transferred it to the court of appeals because of lack of involvement of title,
its overruling by Butler was erroneous. The Pulley case, supra, was mistakenly overruled
for the same reason as the Hall case in Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, 325 Mo.
1194, 30 S.W.2d 605 (en bane), trans'd, 32 S.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1930). Therefore,
the Hall and Pulley cases should still be good authority.
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5.160. ACTIONS TO QUIET AND DETERMINE TITLE
Since 1897, any person claiming any title, estate or interest in real estate
adverse to the claim of another party may bring an action seeking a de-
termination and adjudication of the interests disputed."'2 The effect of the
judgment in this action is a final determination of these disputed interests.0 3
Generally, jurisdiction of an appeal from an action to quiet title to vari-
ous disputed interests in real estate is in the supreme court. 0" Since what-
ever interest is sought to be adjudicated is finally determined between the
parties, the effect requirement is fulfilled.
But title must also be disputed in an action to determine title, if title is
to be involved. The mere form of action to quiet title does not in itself de-
termine jurisdiction of an appeal.20 5 If the ownership of the fee is conceded,
and the parties dispute only the ownership of a lien,200 a lease,20, or an
option to purchase, 0 8 title is not "involved" because these interests do not
202. Mo. Laws 1897, at 74 (now Mo. Rav. STAT. § 527.150 (1959)). Prior to
1897, only a party in possession of the real estate could institute an action the possible
effect of which was a final adjudication of title.
203. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 527.150 (1959).
204. DeBold v. Leslie, 381 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. 1964); Beauchamp v. Beauchamp,
381 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1964); Clemmons v. Smith, 379 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1964);
Buschmeyer v. Eikermann, 378 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1964); Wolf v. Miravalle, 372 S.W.2d
28 (Mo. 1963); Lloyd v. Garren, 366 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1963); Parrish v. McDaniel,
358 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1962); Franck Bros., Inc. v. Rose, 301 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1957);
Evans v. Buente, 284 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1955); Albi v. Reed, 281 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.
1955); Stull v. Johnson, 280 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1955); Barker v. Allen, 273 S.W.2d 191
(Mo. 1954); Tayler v. Tayler, 243 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1951); Northcutt v. Eager, 132
Mo. 265, 33 S.W. 1125 (1896); Missouri City Coal Co. v. Walker, 183 S.W.2d 350 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1944), trans'd, 188 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1945); Juede v. Sims, 147 Mo. App. 65,
126 S.W. 251 (1910), trans'd, 258 Mo. 26, 166 S.W. 1048 (1914); Kelmcl v. Nine,
121 Mo. App. 718, 97 S.W. 635 (1906), trans'd.
205. Bussen v. Del Commune, 195 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Mo. 1946), trans'd, 239 Mo.
App. 859, 199 S.W.2d 13 (1947); Peatman v. Worthington Drainage Dist., 168 S.W.2d
57, 59 (Mo.), trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 64, 176 S.W.2d 539 (1943).
206. Stumpe v. City of Washington, 328 Mo. 1081, 43 S.W.2d 414 (1931) (en bane),
trans'd, 54 S.W.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1932); Platt v. Parker-Washington Co., 235 Mo. 467,
139 S.W. 124 (1911), trans'd, 161 Mo. App. 663, 144 S.W. 143 (1912); Rowe v. Cur-
rent River Land & Cattle Co., 167 Mo. 305, 66 S.W. 928 (1902).
207. Bussen v. Del Commune, 195 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1946).
208. In Fisher v. Lavelock, 282 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1955), trans'd, 290 S.W.2d 655
(Ct. App. 1956), the plaintiff sought to cancel an option to purchase. The court held
title not involved notwithstanding the plaintiff's prayer that the court declare the
defendant have no further right, title, or interest. The real issue was the validity of the
option, which in itself transferred no interest in real estate, and jurisdiction over that
issue was not determined solely on the prayer for relief. Of course, if the holder of the
option had brought suit to enforce it, jurisdiction on appeal would be in the supreme
court. Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956). See § 5.140, note 195
supra and accompanying text.
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constitute title to real estate. When the full title itself or some interest
constituting real estate is disputed, title thereto is "involved" in an action to
quiet and determine title to that interest." 9
5.170. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this section is to formulate a simplified statement of the
tests used by the courts in determining "real estate" appellate jurisdiction,
to suggest methods by which to resolve the inconsistencies which have de-
veloped and to appraise the function performed by the "real estate" cate-
gory of original appellate jurisdiction.
5.171. Analysis of "Title to Real Estate" and "Involvement"
The constitutional mandate suggests a two-step analysis in determining
if a case is properly appealable to the supreme court: (1) whether there is
any interest constituting title to real estate in the case, and (2) whether
that title to real estate is involved according to criteria derived from the
case law.
5.171(a). "Title to Real Estate" as the Jurisdictional Referent
In analysis of its jurisdiction, the court first refers to the interests sought
to be affected by the judgment and determines whether any constitutes
title to real estate, i.e., ownership of an estate in land. It is not sufficient
that a question of real estate be implicated in the facts of the case; this
might have been sufficient, however, had the constitutional provision been
worded "involve real estate." Rather, title to a specific interest in real estate
must be the subject matter of the dispute in order to confer supreme court
jurisdiction. Little difficulty is generally experienced in defining what con-
stitutes an estate in land. In addition to the fee itself, a number of interests
less than total enjoyment of the land will suffice for supreme court juris-
diction. Generally the line between real estate and non-real estate interests
has been drawn at easements. For example, equitable interests under a
trust, life estates and easements are real estate; possession, liens and dower
inchoate are not. The definitive line is clear except for certain marginal in-
terests; there is doubt whether restrictive covenants and deeds of trust con-
stitute real estate. Problems arising at this stage concern actions to set
aside or establish muniments; in some cases the court need only point out
that muniments evidence an underlying freehold, but in cases in which
209. See, e.g., Tayler v. Tayler, 243 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1951) (defendant claimed
life estate); Missouri City Coal Co. v. Walker, 183 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App.)4
trans'd, 188 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1944) (dispute of the full title claimed by adverse
possession).
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the muniment is a deed of trust or mortgage an inconsistency has arisen
resulting from the view that the mortgage or deed of trust is only a security
interest-not title to real estate-in suits to establish, but that it evidences
an estate in land in suits to cancel. It would seem desirable that all appeals
concerning mortgages and deeds of trust be heard by one or the other of
the mutually exclusive appellate courts, a result which could be effected by
consistent definition of the interest evidenced by a deed of trust.
5.171(b). "Involvement" of Title to Real Estate
The second and more troublesome inquiry is whether title is involved.
For "involvement," (1) the judgment must directly affect the title, and (2)
the parties must ordinarily dispute which has title at the time the suit is
filed.
It has been implied in some cases that for title to real estate to be in-
volved, a judgment that would "encumber the land and cloud the clarity
of defendants' otherwise perfect fee simple title" would be sufficient.21
Were this true, suits seeking to establish liens or leaseholds would be heard
only by the supreme court (which is not the case). However, the cases
which imply that "encumbrance" involves title (notably "easement" cases)
actually require in addition that the judgment would affirm the fact that
an interest in real estate has been carved out of the fee simple estate and
establish it in the claimant.
A judgment directly affects title if it is a finally binding determination or
adjudication that title is in the prevailing party. Title is also directly af-
fected if the judgment sought would divest any aspect of title from one of
the parties without the aid of subsequent proceedings. A judgment divesting
title from one party and giving it to another is a final determination and acts
as a deed to the prevailing party of the title interest litigated.
Also, in order that title be involved it is generally required that the parties
210. Under the dictionary meaning of "involvement" as "entanglement" or "com-
plication," it could be said that any judgment establishing an encumbrance "involves"
the fee title. Although this rationale has been rejected by the majority of cases, it was
the basis for jurisdiction in Toothaker v. Pleasant, 315 Mo. 1239, 1248, 288 S.W. 38, 42
(1926). The case concerned restrictive covenants which, said the court, "entangled"
and "complicated" title. It has also been implied that if a decree purported to remove a
cloud from plaintiffs' title, jurisdiction would be in the supreme court. Superior Press
Brick Co. v. City of St. Louis, 152 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Mo.), trans'd, 155 S.W.2d
290 (Ct. App. 1941) (suit to enjoin enforcement of zoning ordinance). Among the
cases rejecting this argument are Pendleton v. Gundaker, 370 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963), trans'd, 381 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. 1964) (dictum); Chapman v. Chapman,
185 S.W. 221, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917). In the latter case the court held title was not
"involved" even though "a judgment awarding plaintiff alimony as a special lien ...
fastens a charge upon the husband's interest in the property."
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dispute which party has title at the time the suit is filed. For example, in
suits to quiet title, the parties both claim that title previously vested in them,
offer proof of their title, and seek its adjudication. Appeals from judgments
in quiet title actions are properly lodged in the supreme court. In condem-
nation actions, however, supreme court jurisdiction fails because title is con-
ceded to be in the condemnee.
The supreme court has not been consistent in denying jurisdiction of ap-
peals from suits in which title is not disputed at the time the action is
brought. In some cases in which title is conceded in the defendant-suits
for specific performance of a land contract 11 or to authorize divestiture of
defendant's titleL---the supreme court has upheld its jurisdiction.
5.172. Application of the Nettleton Bank Formula: Suggested Approach
The test for involvement has been often quoted from Nettleton Bank v.
Estate of McGauhey: "The judgment sought or rendered must be such as
will determine title in some measure or degree adversely to one litigant and
in favor of another, or, as some of the cases say, take title from one litigant
and give it to another."21
In actions in which there is a dispute concerning which party has title at
the time the suit is filed, the suit's object is the resolution of the contro-
versy. The judgment sought would then only declare that one party has
acquired title in the past, adversely to the contentions of the other. Such is
the case, for example, in suits for partition or to quiet title. The second dis-
junctive in Nettleton Bank that the judgment sought or rendered must "take
title from one litigant and give it to another" is incompatible with the dis-
pute requirement. The Nettleton Bank disjunctive can be satisfied only when
divestiture of title is the object of the claimant, who must not only concede
but assert title in the other party in order that he may bring the proper par-
ties into court. The requirements of title dispute and title divestiture are
mutually exclusive and cannot both be met in the same case.
The results reached by application of the Nettleton Bank formula have
been mainly uniform, but the imprecision of the language and its interpreta-
tion in some cases that for judgment to involve title it must take title from
one litigant and give it to another has provided the potential for dishar-
211. § 5.140; McCrory v. Brinckmann, 379 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1964).
212. German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 383 S.W.2d 704
(Mo. 1964). Defendants were concededly the owners of burial lots but the trial decree,
granting the relief prayed, authorized abandonment of the cemetery. The supreme court
had jurisdiction "in view of the object of the relief sought to terminate the interests of
burial lot owners in the land in question." Id. at 706.
213. 318 Mo. 948, 953, 2 S.W.2d 771, 774 (en banc), trans'd from court of appeals,
retrans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1084, 11 S.W.2d 1093 (1928). (Emphasis added.)
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mony, and has in fact caused inconsistent results. In Ashauer v. Peer,21"' the
plaintiff sought a judgment determining the dividing line between two ad-
joining tracts of land, a determination requiring construction of the two
deeds that had passed title to the tracts. The supreme court transferred the
appeal, holding that the judgment only accomplished the removal of an am-
biguity in description and the settling of the controversy as to the location of
a boundary line. In effect, the parties disputed and sought adjudica-
tion of title to the strip of land between the lines claimed by the adverse par-
ties. When such dispute of prior vesting of title is sought to be finally adjudi-
cated, title is usually considered to be involved, because the judgment will
directly "determine the title in some measure or degree adversely to one liti-
gant and in favor of another." However, in Ashauser the court denied juris-
diction on the basis of the second Nettleton Bank disjunctive because "the
judgment did not take title from plaintiff and give it to [defendant] ... and
this because there was never any title in plaintiff except to the land described
in her deed, and that title was not molested.... The only thing the judg-
ment did was to settle the controversy between plaintiff and [defendant] ...
as to what land was conveyed by their respective interest." ' 5 It is submitted
that this is the precise procedure followed in actions to quiet title, which
appeals are now accepted by the supreme court.21
If the disjunctive in Nettleton Bank requiring divestiture were correctly
viewed as a sufficient alternative to the "determination" effect of the pre-
ceding clause rather than an independent requisite to title involvement, re-
suits such as the Ashauer case could be avoided. A simpler and more easily
administered test for involvement could be formulated by elimination of the
divestiture disjunctive of Nettleton Bank and modification of the dispute
requirement by requiring only that the parties dispute title at the time of
judgment. This definition of dispute would not change the jurisdictional re-
sult in any case in which title is presently held to be involved, whether ac-
tions to establish a prior vesting of title or to effect a title divestiture, except
condemnation proceedings.
5.173. The Category of "Title to Real Estate": An Appraisal
The drafters of the constitution primarily intended to solve the work load
problem of the supreme court when they adopted the categorical allocation
214. 346 Mo. 218, 139 S.W.2d 991 (1940), trans'd, 147 S.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1941).
215. Id. at 222-23, 139 S.W.2d at 992; see City of Marshfield v. Haggard, 300
S.W.2d 419 (Mo.), trans'd, 304 S.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1957); Brotherton v. City of
Jackson, 385 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). But see Grimes v. Armstrong, 304
S.W.2d 703 (Mo. 1957).
216. Section 5.160. Garnett, Appellate Practice, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
for 1940, 6 Mo. L. Rav. 390, 394 (1941), indicates "that the court might well have
sustained its jurisdiction upon the theory that the substantive effect of the trial court's
decree was to quiet the title in accordance with the clarified description; but the court
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of original appellate jurisdiction. 1' By the nature of the categories which
they selected-for example, felony rather than misdemeanor, and cases in-
volving sums of money only above a specified "amount"-the drafters mani-
fested an intention to accomplish the division on the basis of importance of
cases.
Evidence of the drafters' intent is found in the statement in an early case
that "the object of the constitutional provision on this subject [title to real
estate] is to appoint the supreme court as the tribunal for the final settlement
of real property law in Missouri, in the hope thereby to secure uniformity
of decision on that important branch of jurisprudence.""21 It is questionable
whether uniformity of decision in real property cases is still the underlying
basis of judicial administration of this category of jurisdiction. By taking
only those cases in which the judgment technically "affects" title, the su-
preme court has diverted to the courts of appeals many cases in which the
substantive "title" issues are identical to those decided in cases fulfilling the
technical "effect" requirement. The decisions of the courts of appeals on
these issues, as well as those of supreme court, stand as precedent. Aban-
donment of a "uniformity of decision" basis for treatment of this category
was accomplished by adoption of article V, section ten of the 1945 constitu-
tion, which forestalls the need of maintaining uniformity through use of
article V, section three. By article V, section ten the supreme court in its
discretion may review any appeal which it believes is important.219
The significance attached to real estate law by the drafters was no doubt
influenced by the prominence of real estate in a primarily agricultural econ-
omy. Land was the primary measure of wealth. It was not a mere com-
modity but the heritage of families which moved rarely even in the span of
generations. Our present-day economy, however, is primarily industrial and
urban. Questions of real estate, as a result, would seem no longer to be of
more inherent importance than other questions of law. 2 It is no longer
acceptable that a question whether plaintiff had acquired a driveway ease-
did not take that view of the matter and transferred the cause to the proper court of
appeals."
217. See "Introduction," part I, notes 12-18.
218. Fischer v. Johnson, 149 Mo. 433, 439, 41 S.W. 203, 205 (1897) (dissenting
opinion). (Emphasis added.)
219. The significance of discretionary selection of important cases by the supreme
court is discussed in the following portions of this symposium: "Conclusion," part II;
"Introduction," part II, notes 50-54 and accompanying text; § 6.051(a), note 33;
J 6.060.
220. In a study commenting on the provision in the Illinois Constitution of 1870
confining jurisdiction of the supreme court to "cases in which a ... freehold . . .is
involved," it was stated: "Assuming that the categories selected for Supreme Court review
accurately reflected the appellate review needs of a predominately agricultural com-
munity, it is doubtful that they satisfy contemporary requirements." A Study of the
Illinois Supreme Court, 15 U. Cnx. L. Rv. 107, 110 (1947).
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ment of several hundred dollars value is more important than a question
whether a note for a personal debt for $14,000 was properly executed.
Without expressly acknowledging it, the supreme court has ignored the
importance of the case principle. The tests of determining whether "title
to real estate" is "involved" developed in the early cases and still remain
with only slight modifications. The court early chose to give the word "in-
volve" a procedural rather than a substantive content. Instead of basing
jurisdiction on substantive issues raised in the course of the trial of the case,
the court chose instead to consider any issue concerning title to land "col-
lateral and incidental" which was not procedurally involved in the judg-
ment. The court's interpretations of "involve" were no doubt motivated by
a realization that if the supreme court were to review every case touching
upon a real property question "on the way to the judgment" an overly
burdensome work load would have resulted.
The cases have exhibited a gradual tendency toward restriction of su-
preme court jurisdiction. An early case holding title was involved in a
trespass action because plaintiff's right to recover depended on main-
tenance of his claim of title was expressly overruled two years later because
plaintiff's title could not be affected by the judgment.22 A line of decisions
upholding supreme court jurisdiction of suits to enjoin threatened tres-
passes were overruled in 1922.222 The long line of cases holding that the
supreme court had jurisdiction of appeals from ejectment actions was over-
ruled in 1936223 and affirmed en banc less than two years later.2 ' The con-
demnation cases particularly illustrate the evolution of restrictive applica-
tion of the "involvement" rule. In 1930, Missouri Power & Light Co. v.
Creed22 overruled the decisions holding that suits to determine only the
221. Fischer v. Johnson, 349 Mo. 443, 41 S.W. 203 (1897), trans'd, overruling Gray
v. Worst, 129 Mo. 122, 31 S.W. 585 (1895).
222. Dillard v. Sanderson, 282 Mo. 436, 222 S.W. 766 (1920) (en bane), frans'd
from court of appeals, retrans'd, 206 Mo. App. 217, 227 S.W. 658 (1921), overruling
Ripkey v. Gresham, 279 Mo. 521, 214 S.W. 851 (1919) (injunction to restrain estab-
lishment of public road) and cases cited therein. This holding was reinforced by Oliver v.
Wilhite, 329 Mo. 524, 45 S.W.2d 1083 (1932), trans'd from 41 S.W.2d 825 (Ct. App.
1931), retransd, 227 Mo. App. 538, 55 S.W.2d 491 (1932), in which the supreme court
declined jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment granting an injunction against en-
forcement of an easement across plaintiff's land.
223. Ballenger v. Windes, 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S.W.2d 882, trans'd, 99 S.W.2d 158
(Ct. App. 1936), overruling Williams v. Maxwell, 82 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1935); Tooker
v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 336 Mo. 592, 80 S.W.2d 691 (1935), trans'd from 63
S.W.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1933).
224. Gibbiny v. Walker, 342 Mo. 156, 113 S.W.2d 792 (en bane), frans'd, 233 Mo,
App. 489, 121 S.W.2d 317 (1938), upholding Ballenger v. Windes, supra note 223.
225. 325 Mo. 1194, 30 S.W.2d 605 (en bane)*, transd, 32 S.W.2d 783 (Ct. App.
1930).
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amount of compensation in condemnation cases were properly appealable
to the supreme court. Finally, in City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 2 in 1949,
the supreme court eliminated virtually all condemnation cases from its "title
to real estate" docket because of lack of a technical "dispute," notwithstand-
ing that "a condemnation suit does take part (or sometimes all) of the land-
owner's title and gives it to the condemnor for just compensation." '227
The Butler decision is the high-water mark of the supreme court's limita-
tion of its jurisdiction. The supreme court has reached a position of strict
application of its tests for involvement of title to real estate in order to re-
lieve itself of hearing any more cases than absolutely necessary.
The importance of the case basis for the inclusion of real estate as a cate-
gorical allocation of supreme court cases has been virtually abandoned as
a factor in the court's threshold determination of jurisdiction. Similarly,
uniformity of decision upon substantive real property issues has been neces-
sarily eliminated as a criterion in jurisdictional decision. It is submitted that
the technical rules purportedly derived to effect these purposes have become
the ends in themselves, and that the real estate category as now conceived
performs only an allocation of cases. The trend of the decisions reflects a
feeling that the category is burdensome and a judicial tendency to eliminate
the appeals of right in real estate cases granted by article V, section three.
226. 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (en banc), trans'd, 223 S.W.2d 831 (Ct. App.
1949), overruling Highway Comm'n v. Gordon, 327 Mo. 160, 36 S.W.2d 105
(1931) (en banc), and cases cited in Butler, supra, at 1224, 219 S.W.2d at 374 n.3. But
ct. German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 383 S.W.2d 704 (Mo.
1964), in which it was conceded that defendants held title to an easement-burial lots-
but the supreme court had jurisdiction of an appeal from the judgment terminating their
easement.
227. City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., supra note 226, at 1225, 219 S.W.2d at 375.
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